Research On Capital Structure,Executive Equity Incentives And Company Performance

From the preliminary assumption of economic structural reform proposed by the Central Economic Work Conference on November 10,2015,to the specific implementation plan of the supply-side structural reform on January 27,2016,and on October 18,2017,it is pointed out that the supply-side structural reform should be deepened.The starting point and the entry point of the supply-side structural reform-de-leverage,is being fully implemented within the scope of Chinese enterprises.However,will the current high leverage of the company have a negative impact on the company's performance? Can corporate deleveraging effectively improve the company's performance level,so as to achieve the desired effect of reform? This article will answer both theoretical and empirical aspects.At the same time,it is not enough for enterprises to rely solely on the external force of state control to de-leverage,but also needs to be coordinated by internal impetus from enterprises themselves.For listed companies,company executives have the final decision-making power of capital structure.How to increase the enthusiasm of senior executives to optimize the capital structure has become a key issue that needs an urgent solution.The principal-agent problem arising from the inconsistent interest objectives between managers and shareholders is the main factor affecting the willingness of senior executives to optimize their capital structure.Currently,the theoretical and practical circles generally believe that equity incentives are a kind of corporate governance that can effectively alleviate the problem of principal-agent.Equity incentives transform the identity of managers,thereby promoting the convergence of interests between managers and shareholders.In addition,it has been more than ten years since the standardization of equity incentives in 2006.The number of enterprises implementing equity incentives has shown an increasing trend every year,and has the conditions for empirical analysis of large sample sizes.Therefore,from the perspective of executive equity incentives,this paper studies whether it can play a regulatory role in the relationship between the capital structure and the company performance,what kind of adjustment role is specifically played,and whether there is a difference in this regulation under different property rights?On the basis of theoretical analysis,this paper also selects 8755 sample data of China's A-share main board listed companies from 2007 to 2017.Through descriptive statistics,the correlation analysis,multiple regression analysis and the robustness test,the effects of executive equity incentives on the relationship between the capital structure and the company performance are discussed in detail,and the following conclusions: Firstly,in the case that the level of leverage in Chinese enterprises is generally high,the level of debt will have a negative impact on the company's performance.Secondly,the implementation of executive equity incentives by listed companies can inhibit the negative impact of debt levels on the company performance.Thirdly,compared with state-owned enterprises,the role of executive equity incentives in non-state-owned enterprises is more obvious.In the end,this paper puts forward relevant policy recommendations based on the conclusions.It is expected that some ideas can be provided for optimizing the capital structure,improving the corporate governance mechanism,and deepening the supply-side structural reform and state-owned enterprise reform.