Research On Executive Incentives,Business Risks And Corporate Performance

As an important part of corporate governance,executive incentives are a kind of compensation for executives,so as to motivate executives to play and retain outstanding talents.If the company can give executives the appropriate incentives,it will help to give full play to the enthusiasm of the executives and encourage them to work harder,which will greatly benefit the company's performance.However,most of the current research still stays in the transmission mechanism and mechanism of interaction between executive incentives and corporate performance,and does not delve into the specific path of action between them.At present,the driving force of China's economic growth is shifting from investment-driven to innovation-driven.Innovation must face risks.How to maintain a balance between innovation growth and risk control is an important guarantee for achieving sustainable growth in corporate performance.As a main force of innovation,China's private listed companies should strengthen their risk management awareness and attach importance to the control of business risks.Therefore,this paper takes business risk as the entry point,and uses it as a mediator variable to place high management incentives,business risks and company performance in the same research framework,and conducts in-depth research on the relationship between the three,which has certain research value.Based on the research of executive incentives,business risks and company performance,this paper is of great significance to improve the existing executive incentive mechanism,enhance the awareness of senior management risk,and formulate a scientific and reasonable performance appraisal system.Therefore,the research results of this paper are a kind of compensation for the existing research deficiencies,and can provide some practical suggestions and suggestions for the improvement of the executive incentive mechanism of private listed companies in China.By reviewing the existing literature on the relationship between executive incentives,business risk and company performance,the paper proposes the research hypothesis based on principal-agent theory,incentive theory,demand hierarchy theory and stakeholder theory.Relevant data analyze the status quo and existing problems of executive incentives,business risks and company performance of private listed companies in China.On this basis,this paper uses the relevant data of China's private listed companies in 2013-2017 to conduct empirical tests,and obtains empirical results,and puts forward substantive opinions and suggestions.The main conclusions of the thesis including:(1)executive monetary compensation and executive shareholding are significantly positively correlated with company performance,andincentives for executives are conducive to the improvement of company performance;(2)executive monetary compensation and executive holdings Both are significantly negatively correlated with operational risks.Incentives to executives are conducive to reducing operational risks;(3)operational risks play a partial intermediary role in executive monetary compensation—company performance,executive shareholding—company performance,The relationship between the two has a reinforcing effect.Therefore,the company should take into account the operational risks when formulating the executive incentive mechanism,strengthen the risk awareness of the executives,encourage them to develop scientific risk management strategies and countermeasures,reduce the company's operational risks,reduce losses,and thus achieve company performance.Continued growth.