Research On Influence Of EVA Assessment On The Investment Efficiency Of Central Enterprises Holding Listed Companies

Scientific and reasonable performance appraisal methods can guide company managers to invest in science.On December 31,2009,the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council promulgated the Interim Measures for the Performance Evaluation of the Heads of Central Enterprises,stipulating that the value-added rate of return on assets should be replaced by economic value added from 2010.EVA is the best indicator of shareholder wealth,and the EVA indicator has an advantage over the ROE.Firstly,the addition of equity capital costs is conducive to maximizing the interests of shareholders;Secondly,excluding recurring gains and losses,join research and development fees and construction in progress,encourage companies to focus on the main business and carry out strategic layout.EVA performance appraisal has established a strong and effective incentive and restraint mechanism in central enterprises and their molecular companies,and infiltrated the value management concept of “maximizing shareholder interests” to corporate decision makers.The assessment results directly affect salary and welfare and job promotion,and the operators consciously combine personal interests with shareholders’ interests.The“win-win” of interests can alleviate the agency conflict between managers and owners and information asymmetry from the source,guide managers to invest cautiously,and pay attention to the risks and returns of investment.The 2007-2017 Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share central enterprises holding listed companies were taken as research samples.On the basis of relevant theoretical analysis,the impact mechanism of EVA assessment on the investment efficiency of listed companies in central enterprises wear discussed,and three progressive research hypotheses were proposed.Firstly,the impact of EVA assessment on the investment efficiency of the central enterprises holding listed companies was studied,then the impact of EVA assessment on different types of listed companies was considered,finally the adjustment effect of the proportion of shares held by central enterprises on the investment efficiency of EVA assessment was discussed.The company’s investment level was selected as the explanatory variable,EVA assessment,Tobin’s Q,major shareholder encroachment as explanatory variables,related transactions,executives’ centralization,cash dividends,independent directors’ ratio,etc.as control variables.The annual variable was used as a dummy variable to establish a multiple regression model,and R was used for regression analysis.The empirical results are as follows:(1)The EVA assessment system is significantly and positively related to the investment efficiency of listed companies in central enterprises;In social welfare companies,the EVA assessment has no significant effect on the improvement of investment efficiency;(2)In commercialcompetition companies,there is no significant negative correlation between EVA assessment and investment efficiency;In strategic monopoly companies,EVA assessment is significantly positively related to investment efficiency;(3)From the perspective of the proportion of shares held by central enterprises,the level of shareholding of central enterprises has played a positive role in regulating the investment efficiency of all listed listed companies in the EVA assessment;(4)From the perspective of the proportion of shares held by central enterprises,in the commercial competition category,the level of shareholding of central enterprises has no significant negative correlation in the impact of EVA assessment on investment efficiency.In strategic monopoly companies,the level of shareholding of central enterprises has a positive adjustment effect in EVA assessment to improve the company’s investment efficiency.In social welfare companies,the positive adjustment effect of the shareholding level is not significant.Finally,policy recommendations were proposed.