The Research On The Influence Ways Of Corporate Governance On External Guarantee Of Listed Companies

As the daily behavior of enterprise operation and management external guarantee of the company is of great significance in ensuring the realization of creditor’s rights,speeding up the circulation of funds and optimizing the allocation of resources.However,the over-guarantee problem of listed companies has affected the normal operation of the company and financial order.For this reason,Therefore,how to deal with the over-guarantee problem of listed companies has become the focus of attention from all walks of life.This paper takes the financial data of listed companies in China from 2013 to 2017 as the research sample,aiming at the influence path of corporate governance on the over-guarantee behavior of listed companies mainly from three aspects:(1)through principal-agent theory,information asymmetry theory and revenue of control theory,this paper analyzes the influence path of corporate governance on over-guarantee behavior of listed companies from the perspective of theory;(2)on the basis of theoretical analysis,the paper puts forward the influence path hypothesis of the former to the latter through scientific and rigorous reasoning,and validates the influence path hypothesis through empirical research;(3)To explore the prevention and control measures of the company’s governance level which alleviate the problem of external over-guarantees of listed companies.The main conclusions of this paper are as follows:(1)by restraining the principal-agent problem within the company,effective board characteristics can restrain the external over-guarantee behavior of the company;(2)by restraining the information asymmetry problem within the company,effective board characteristics can restrain the external guarantee behavior of the company;(3)by restraining the principal-agent problem within the company,the effective ownership structure can restrain the external guarantee behavior of the company;(4)by restraining the information asymmetry problem within the company,the effective ownership structure can restrain the external guarantee behavior of the company.on this basis,in order to reduce information asymmetry problem and alleviate principal-agent,the corresponding measures are put forward from listed companies,which will relief the guarantee problem of listed companies.