Research On Influences Of Managerial Equity Incentive On Enterprise’s Behavior Of Tax Avoidance

From the perspective of the experiences of countries with more advanced market economy,managerial equity incentive is an effective approach to deal with the principle-agent problem.Equity incentive,as a salary system directly related to enterprise value,is one of the most important methods of management incentive.It can weaken the principle-agent problem to some extent,which causes that enterprises use the means of avoiding tax in order to realize the goal of saving costs.As the governance environment of our country’s companies is not perfect,the equity incentive system has a short history and is immature,relevant taxation laws and regulations are not perfect,etc.,whether are the overseas effectual equity incentive applicable for our country or not?What influence do different equity incentive ways have on enterprise’s tax avoidance?With respect to this problem,the influences of enterprise’s managerial equity incentive on enterprise’s behavior of tax avoidance are expected to be inspected through use of the financial data of our listed companies in this paper.It is noteworthy that due to our special national conditions,the ownership attribute of large amounts of listed companies is owned by all people,i.e.a state-owned enterprise.Enterprises of different ownership types are different from each other in operation theories,governance structures,regulatory conditions and other aspects.As a result,enterprises definitely will adopt different measures and methods in managerial equity incentive to pursue their own interest objectives.Thus,researching state-owned and non-state-owned enterprises separately conforms to our country’s practical situation.In this paper,the optimal contract theory,effective tax planning theory,management rights and other theories are chosen to clear up domestic and overseas theories related to managerial equity incentive and enterprise’s avoidance of tax and rational analysis on the relationship between managerial equity incentive and enterprise’s tax avoidance is conducted;secondly,the financial panel data of A-share listed companies in our country from 2010 to 2015 is chosen to build multiple linear regression model;empirical analysis is conducted for the influences of managerial equity incentive on enterprise’s behavior of tax avoidance and analysis results are finally drawn;suggestions are put forward for our listed companies to implement effective managerial incentive,basis are raised for expanding the theory of enterprise’s tax avoidance and perfecting laws of tax and help is given to tax departments.