Research On The Motivation And Performance Impact Of The Competition For Control Rights Under The Background Of Mixed Reform

In 2013,the third plenary session of the 18th central committee of the communist party of China pointed out the need to actively develop the mixed-ownership economy and further defined the development direction of the mixed-ownership economy.Therefore,the mixed-ownership reform was raised to an unprecedented political height and became a strong driving force for deepening the reform of state-owned enterprises.As one of the important ways of mixed ownership reform,private enterprise equity participation is widely used in the process of mixed ownership reform.However,in the process of mixed reform,with the entry of new investors,the competition for corporate control between new major shareholders and the original management occurs from time to time,which has a profound impact on the development of the company.Shanghai Jahwa is the first enterprise in Shanghai to launch the concession of state-owned shares.After the reform of mixed ownership,ping an,the new major private shareholder,competes for the right of control with the former company executives.The case is typical and worth in-depth study and exploration.Based on the existing research results and the basic situation of the competition for control right after the mixed reform of Shanghai Jahwa,this paper mainly discusses three problems:(1)Why the competition for control right occurs after the mixed reform,and what are the motivations for the competition for control right;(2)What influence the competition for control right has on the performance of enterprises;(3)What are the reasons why the competition for control rights affects corporate performance?In this paper,the basic situation of the mixed reform of Shanghai Jahwa and the competition for control rights is analyzed as the basis for the subsequent analysis.Then,the author analyzes the reasons for the competition for control right after the mixed reform from three aspects:the company's operation and development philosophy,corporate governance issues and the value appeals of major shareholders and management,and answers the first research question.Secondly,Tobin's Q value and financial indicators are used to analyze the impact of control right competition on enterprise performance,and to answer the second research question.Finally,from the perspectives of management,business strategy and founder,this paper discusses the reasons why competition for control rights affects corporate performance and answers the third research question.The research conclusions of this paper are as follows:(1)The mixed ownership reform itself of Shanghai Jahwa has brought a positive impact on corporate perfonnance,with the stock price rising continuously and the growth rate of ROE and net profit also increasing significantly.(2)Mix change original intention is good,but not necessarily do not appear a problem.After the mixed reform of Shanghai Jahwa,ping an,the financial capital,was introduced to become the controlling shareholder,which caused conflicts with the original management in many aspects and triggered the competition for control rights.(3)The competition for control rights has a negative impact on the company's performance,with the stock price falling to the limit,the market value evaporating seriously and the business performance declining.And the effect on short-term performance is more significant than that on long-term performance.(4)The competition for control rights leads to frequent personnel changes,the management restructuring adjusts the company's business strategy from the direction,the founder's departure hits the confidence of market investors,but also brings about the loss of human capital,thus reducing the performance of the enterprise.The application value of this paper lies in:on the one hand,it can provide meaningful reference for the selection and introduction of private capital in the process of mixed-ownership reform,make it more rational to choose institutional investors,better design the introduction scheme,and find a more suitable path for the long-term development of state-owned enterprises.On the other hand,it also provides experience or lessons for company managers to better manage control rights and avoid the possible competition for control rights.