Pledge Of Stock Rights?Counterbalance Of Board Of Directors And The Tunneling Behavior Of Controlling Shareholders

The economy is in a transition stage in our country,our country has existed in many listed companies overwhelmingly dominant controlling shareholders,the corporate governance main contradiction and the conflict has diffuse from the equity of shareholders and management agency problem is converted into equity concentration condition of agency of controlling shareholders and minority shareholders,the controlling shareholder in the group has played a pivotal role in internal governance.Equity concentration could be effectively while pressing companies to enhance the level of business operation and supervision of executives to make further business decisionmaking process,but there are still some systematic problems,medium and small shareholders in the case of the loose legal shelter,and no ability to change the company's major business decisions,on the contrary the controlling shareholder holding self-interest intention,has the ability to make decisions on the company's major business decisions,thereby infringe on other shareholders to seek personal gain.After the reform of nontradable shares in our country the pledge of shares for controlling shareholders to finance with the advantages of simplicity and low cost.Compared with the complicated procedures of ordinary bank loans,such a financing method has more convenient financing advantages and the ability to activate the stock price resources of listed companies,so it is favored by the controlling shareholders.After a portion of the controlling shareholder's equity is pledged,they can still operate or dispose of the listed company's assets by virtue of the part of control they enjoy.Therefore,some scholars believe(Yeh et al.,2003)that equity pledge will lead to the separation of control rights and cash flow rights,making the agency problem between controlling shareholders and other shareholders more serious and further strengthening the motivation of controlling shareholders to "tunneling" the listed company.At the same time,by setting up professional committee,with the directors of the many years of accumulated experience in the day-to-day running of the listed company supervision board nomination,executive pay process and the process of the audit process,etc.,put forward represents the views of other small and medium-sized shareholders,stop activities that damage the interests of minority shareholders,efforts to build a fair,transparent,internal governance mechanism.Therefore,the board of directors should have a clear understanding of its responsibilities and give full play to its functions,so as to gain a firm foothold in the company and improve the internal governance mechanism.Furthermore,it can prevent and cure the controlling shareholder from tunneling the listed company.Based on the dominant position of controlling shareholders in the listed companies and the characteristics of controlling shareholders' equity pledge behavior and the governance functions of the board of directors,this paper examines the influence of controlling shareholders' equity pledge behavior on their encroachment on the resources of listed companies.In addition,the balance effect of the board of directors is further retroactive,and a series of cross-multiple terms of equity pledge and a series of indicators to measure the balance of the board of directors are added to investigate whether the board of directors has the same governance effect under the condition of the pledge of the controlling shareholder's equity.In addition,according to the nature of listed companies,The article compares state-owned enterprises with non-state-owned enterprises.It is found that due to the fact that state-owned enterprises have few rigid institutional restrictions on the behavior of controlling assets,the correlation between equity pledge and tunneling behavior of controlling shareholders in non-state-owned companies is more significant than that in state-owned companies.In order to test the validity of this hypothesis from multiple perspectives,this paper also starts from the perspective that equity pledge produces the risk of transfer of control right,and selects samples that may face the risk of transfer of control right from the large sample of equity pledge for testing.The results show that when faced with the risk of control right transfer,the controlling shareholders of enterprises that have already pledged their shares have stronger tunneling intentions,and the more times they have pledged their shares,the more tunneling intentions the controlling shareholders have.In the robustness test of this paper,the ratio of net funds occupied for business of listed companies to total assets was used,and the scale of the board of directors was used to measure the balance effect,and the results still supported master regression.The content consists of six modules.The content that this article will elaborate is divided into 6 parts concretely.The first part is the introduction.Mainly from the perspective of research background and research significance,tells the story of the benefits of the company for equity pledge at the present stage,the controlling shareholders "rampant" why this is so empty in the company's action,and combined with the governance of the board of directors the checks and balances,summarizes the research target of this article,at the same time,the full text is divided into six chapters,and further on the basis of constructing the basic framework in this paper.The second part is the literature review about the pledge of stock rights,the check and balance of board of directors and the tunneling behavior of controlling shareholders.In this paper,according to the dynamics of each study session from equity pledge,hollowed behavior motive and the board of directors of checks and balances of all kinds of indexes and empty behavior relationship to comb of related literature,the three aspects of equity pledge is reviewed and the controlling shareholder hollowed behavior of inner link,and the internal governance functions of the board of directors of hollowed behavior the effect of controlling shareholders.The third part is the theoretical basis of equity pledge,board balance and controlling shareholder tunneling behavior.This part mainly gives the board of directors of the equity pledge,hollowed definition,and the concept of checks and balances,the controlling shareholder of the three correlation analyzing theory,and expounds the related theory of the four,including due to the big shareholders and other small and medium-sized shareholders have a conflict of interest the principal-agent theory and related financing cost of different transaction cost theory,transaction both sides on the market the information asymmetry theory,and because of the different transaction cost and risk of the optimal sequence financing theory.The fourth part is theoretical analysis and research design.After an in-depth analysis of the theory,this paper proposes the research hypothesis,establishes the expected relationship between the risk of equity pledge and the tunneling intention of controlling shareholders,and adds the board of directors' check and balance index to propose the governance effect of the board of directors' check and balance index between the two.The fifth part is the empirical test between the pledge of equity,the check and balance of board of directors and the tunneling behavior of controlling shareholders.In establishing a good research model and proposes the corresponding research hypothesis,based on the first preliminary by using descriptive statistics and analysis of the correlation between each variable to anticipation hypothesis is set up,followed by the multivariate regression analysis,finally from the perspective of multiple choice of different index to research hypotheses for further research and robustness test.The sixth part is the conclusion and inspiration.This paper summarizes the research conclusions,and the deficiencies of this paper and the corresponding policy recommendations.