Control,Executive Compensation Incentives And Efficiency Of Capital Restructuring

At present,the traditional unbalanced,uncoordinated and unsustainable pattern of extensive growth in China's economic development will gradually withdraw from the stage of history.Economic development is in a new normal period,and many enterprises are constantly carrying out reforms to adapt to new changes.The adjustment of capital structure has always been the focus of enterprise development.As owners and actual operators of enterprises,the first major shareholders and business operators have a great influence on the effects of capital structure adjustment.Enterprises with different property rights and different management control rights have different resources and their own characteristics.It should also have a different impact on capital restructuring.By exploring the influence of control power and executive compensation mechanism on the adjustment of capital structure,this paper hopes to provide the necessary theoretical basis for the practice of the executive compensation incentive plan of government regulatory authorities and listed companies.It also provides a certain basis for the reform of state-owned enterprises 'mixed ownership and supply side structure.This paper through a large number of relevant literature,the domestic and foreign capital structure adjustment related theory to understand and comb.Based on the analysis of the theory of dynamic balance of capital structure,the theory of supervision,the theory of entrusted agency,the hypothesis of "tunnel effect" and the theory of incentive,the research framework of the regulatory role played by the control of the largest shareholder of listed companies and the efficiency of the adjustment of the capital structure and executive compensation incentives is constructed.And the listed companies according to the nature of property rights and management control to carry out further analysis.Based on this,a corresponding empirical model was constructed.Taking the A-share listed companies in China from 2006 to 2017 as a research sample,the influence of controlling rights of major shareholders on the efficiency of capital structure adjustment was investigated,and the regulatory role of executive compensation incentive in the relationship between the two was further explored.At the same time,considering the property right nature of the enterprise and the influence of management control,this paper studies whether the above two issues are different in different property rights and different management control rights.Finally,some conclusions and recommendations are drawn.he conclusion of the inquiry shows that: 1.The proportion of shares of the largest shareholder of an enterprise can have a positive impact on the optimization and adjustment of the enterprise's capital structure.Second,in the positive impact of the control of the first major shareholder on the capital structure,the private holding company is superior to the state-owned holding company,and the two-function combination enterprise is superior to the two-position separation enterprise.Third,the compensation allocation of senior management personnel has a positive regulatory effect on the efficiency of capital structure adjustment.The greater the executive compensation incentive,the stronger the influence of the control of the largest shareholder on the efficiency of capital structure adjustment.The private holding company is superior to the state holding enterprise in the optimization of capital structure adjustment by executive compensation incentive.Two-job separation enterprise is superior to two-job integration enterprise.Finally,the paper puts forward suggestions such as improving internal and external governance,increasing executive compensation incentives,and establishing interaction mechanism between state-owned enterprises and private enterprises.