Research On Tax Competition Of Local Governments In China

The competition for high-quality tax sources has always been the "secret" for local governments to achieve rapid growth in fiscal revenue and GDP.Under the combined effect of decentralized fiscal system and GDP-advanced evaluation and incentive mechanism,competition among local governments has become increasingly fierce.Tax competition has become one of the most important means for local governments to develop their local economies.At the same time,the liquidity of factor resources is constantly improving with the development of the market economy,and to a certain extent,the local government's competition for tax resources has been intensified.Taking the economic effects of tax competition as an entry point,the benign tax competition between regions can accelerate regional economic growth and promote the flow of production factors and the provision of public goods.Conversely,vicious tax competition will disrupt the laws of market economy and distort resource allocation and The distribution of tax burden.At present,due to China's unmatched financial powers,broad discretion,unscientific performance evaluation and other factors,China's current local government has broken through the policy bottom line,tax protectionism and other vicious tax competition issues,and has caused local fiscal risks to intensify.A series of negative effects such as unreasonable resource allocation and unbalanced public expenditure structure.In this context,based on the economic effects of local tax competition in China,it is hoped that the definition of benign tax competition and vicious tax competition can be used to define whether local tax competition is benign or malignant,and to build a good local tax competition for later.Order provides reference.At present,the ultimate goal of various types of tax competition between local governments in China is to promote the continuous growth of local GDP.However,due to the vast territory of China,the imbalance between regional economic development and tax competition leads to the complexity of tax competition economic effects.The empirical perspective explores whether tax competition between local governments in different regions of China will actually promote economic growth and what impact it will have.Based on this,this paper intends to use the threshold panel measurement model to study the economic effects of tax competition.By selecting the data of 31 provinces in China from 2003 to 2017 to establish the threshold panel model,it is found that although the tax competition in the eastern provinces promotes economic growth,it promotes As the degree of tax competition intensifies,it weakens;for the central provinces,regardless of the extent of tax competition,it will inhibit economic growth;for western provinces,as tax competition increases,its inhibition on economic growth will The stronger it is.Based on the above research,in order to construct a benign local tax competition order and promote the coordinated development of inter-regional economy,this paper puts forward relevant suggestions from various angles.In essence,to reduce the occurrence of vicious tax competition between places is to prevent disorderly repeated game behavior between places.Specifically,the first is to speed up the construction of tax incentives and improve the taxation legislation system;the second is to promote the transparency of local tax competition;the third is to optimize the local government governance environment;the fourth is to build a scientific performance evaluation mechanism.