| In the face of ever-changing market environment and increasingly fierce market competition,innovation has become the best choice for all of the companies to achieve core competitiveness,maintain market competitive position and maintain profitability.R&D investment is the foundation and the key to enterprise innovation,so companies must attach great importance and pay enough attention to R&D investment.Corporate governance is an important foundation for corporate innovation.As an important external mechanism of corporate governance,institutional investors can have an important impact on companies’corporate innovation decision.It can be seen that RD investment is supervised by external institutional investors and decided by the game between management and institutional investors.At present,scholars have three hypotheses about the institutional investors’influence of corporate governance and innovation,which is effective supervision hypothesis,invalid supervision hypothesis and negative effect hypothesis It can be seen that the general analysis of the role of institutional investors in corporate governance is not comprehensive.In the past ten years,the Chinese government has vigorously supported and developed institutional investors.Institutional investors have made great progress in China’s securities market,forming a diversified pattern including securities investment funds,securities firms,QFIIs,social security funds,and at all.Different institutional investors have great differences in investment objectives,profit channels,business contact,etc.,which in turn affect their enthusiasm for participating in corporate governance and supervising management decisions,thus having different impacts on corporate innovation decisions.In China,the phenomenon that the largest shareholder hold the most shares is very common,so the second type of agency problem is more prominent in China.Then,under the background of China’s monopoly,the influence of institutional investors on corporate innovation has its practical significance.This paper measures the company’s shareholding structure from the two major shareholder holdings and equity checks and balances.Equity structure and institutional investors,as important internal and external mechanisms of corporate governance,have an important impact on corporate governance,which in turn affects corporate innovation decisions.This paper combines internal governance research with external governance research to explore the regulatory effects of different equity structures on heterogeneous institutional investors and corporate innovation.This article focuses on the relationship between two heterogeneous institutional investors and corporate innovation,combined with the internal and external corporate governance mechanisms,mainly to study the following issues:First,two types of institutional investors have their own different influences in R&D innovations as they have different shareholding concepts and business contacts with companies.Second,as far as internal governance is concerned,whether the largest shareholder’s shareholding and equity checks and balances have a regulatory effect on the relationship between the two institutional investors and corporate innovation.By summarizing and combing the existing research-related related literatures and theory,this paper puts forward the mechanism and mechanism of the heterogeneous institutional investors on the company’s RD innovation.The assumptions about the shareholder’s shareholding and equity balance on the regulatory role of heterogeneous institutional investors and corporate innovation.In order to verify the hypothesis,this paper selects the listed companies that disclose RD data from China’s A shares from 2012 to 2017 as the research object.In order to prevent the endogenous problems between institutional investors and corporate RD,this paper selects the independent variable data of the first phase.This paper collects relevant data through CSMAR database and WIND database,in which institutional investors share data from WIND database.The empirical research found that:first,pressure-resisting institutional investors can promote enterprise innovation;second,pressure-sensitive institutional investors have no influence on corporate innovation;third,equity concentration is aimed at pressure-resistant institutional investors and enterprise innovation.The relationship has a negative regulation effect.Fourth,equity checks and balances have a positive adjustment effect on the relationship between pressure-resisting institutional investors and corporate innovation.Based on the research conclusions about the capital structure,institution investors and innovation,this paper put forward four advices:First,the government should strengthen support for enterprise innovation and encourage enterprises to carry out innovation and interaction;second,the government should continue to support and regulate the development of institutional investors in China,especially the development of pressure-resisting institutional investors,as it play a positive role in corporate governance;Third,the enterprises should develop a diversified shareholder,structure,strengthen the voice of pressure-resistant institutional investors in corporate governance;Fourth,the enterprises should further improve the information disclosure system of research and development projects.In general,the research in this paper has deepened the confirmation of the differences between heterogeneous institutional investors in corporate governance and the impact of RD investment,and combined with the internal and external governance mechanisms to explore the regulatory role of equity structure with institutional investors and innovations.This has important theoretical and practical significance for promoting enterprise RD investment,improving corporate shareholding structure,and supporting and regulating the development of institutional investors. |
