Research On The Impact Of Management Stock Ownership On Cost Viscosity From The Perspective Of Debt Governance

In an increasingly competitive environment,enterprises must improve their competitive advantages and status,and they must be in charge of the control of costs and expenses.The cost control plays an indispensable role in promoting industrial upgrading,effectively allocating resources and reducing operating costs.The study of cost stickiness can not only effectively reveal the cost management behavior within the enterprise,but also improve the efficiency of enterprise cost control,and thus improve the business performance.In the current research on cost stickiness,agency problem has become one of the main causes of cost stickiness.As the executor of business management activities,management,which controls the amount and allocation of resources,often generates self-interest motivation,excavates personal interests from it,and makes the cost sticky.And debt has a certain restrictive effect on the management’s personal self-interest behavior,and then restrain the generation of cost stickiness.Due to the relatively large fixed assets of manufacturing enterprises,the resource adjustment cost is more obvious,and the cost and expense characteristics are more significant.Therefore,based on the analysis of relevant theories,this paper chooses the manufacturing industry data of A-share listed companies in China from 2012 to 2016 as the research sample.First of all,it verifies whether there is cost stickiness in China’s manufacturing listedcompanies.Secondly,it discusses the impact mechanism of managerial ownership on cost stickiness.Finally,the debt governance mechanism is introduced to analyze the constraints of different debt sizes and maturities on management behavior,and then to restrain the cost stickiness.Finally,the following conclusions are drawn: First of all,the cost of listed companies in China’s A-share manufacturing industry does have a sticky character;Secondly,there is a significant positive relationship between managerial ownership and cost stickiness;Thirdly,after introducing debt governance factors,it is found that debt scale has a restraining effect on the positive relationship between managerial ownership and cost stickiness.Compared with long-term debt,short-term debt has a stronger restraining effect on managerial behavior and a more significant restraining effect on both of them.Finally,according to the above conclusions,this paper puts forward some beneficial suggestions for the operation and development of Listed Companies in China,hoping that enterprises can optimize the cost structure and resource allocation,so as to help enterprises occupy a dominant position in the future development.