Manager Risk Preference?audit Quality And Stock Price Collapse Risk

The stock price crash occurred frequently,which greatly disrupted the operational order of the securities market,affected the stability of investor sentiment,reduced the efficiency of capital allocation,and seriously affected the economic development.Previous research on the risk of stock price collapse has focused on factors such as production,sales,management,and decision-making environment,but it may also be affected by managerial characteristics.As the strategic decision-maker of the enterprise,the attitude of the manager to the risk will affect the decision-making of the enterprise,which will affect the realization of the value of the enterprise,and ultimately the fluctuation of the stock price in the market;then,the risk preference of the manager will risk the stock price collapse.What effect? This is the first question to be explored in this article.In addition,social auditing is an important external supervisor of enterprises.High-quality auditing can effectively reduce the degree of information asymmetry between investors and managers,alleviate the problem of principal-agents,deepen investors' understanding of the real operating conditions of enterprises,and increase the concealment of managers.The cost of negative information,thus effectively reducing the probability of stock company's stock price plunging;therefore,this paper continues to explore the role of audit quality in regulating the relationship between manager's risk preference and stock price crash,and understand the role of external audit supervision.Further,the nature of property rights of listed companies is different.On the one hand,it will lead to the difference of the irrational factors of managers in the decision-making of the company.On the other hand,the value requirements of the audit services will be different.Therefore,this paper further explores the nature of different property rights.In enterprises,the impact of managerial risk preference on stock price collapse risk and the difference in audit quality adjustment.To this end,this paper takes the Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies as the research sample,selects 2009-2016 as the research period,and finds:(1)The manager's risk preference is positively related to the stock price collapse risk,that is,the more the manager prefers the risk,the stock price collapses.The greater the probability;(2)the audit quality can weaken the positive correlation between the manager's risk preference and the stock price crash risk,that is,the higher the audit quality,the lower the probability that the manager's risk preference will cause the stock price collapse risk;(3)Compared with state-owned enterprises,the positive correlation between managerial risk preference and stock price collapse risk in non-state-owned enterprises is stronger;(4)Compared with state-owned enterprises,the relationship between audit quality and manager's risk preference and stock price collapse risk in non-state-owned enterprises The weakening ability is stronger.The significance of this paper is mainly as follows:(1)Enrich the research on the influencing factors of stock price crash,expand the economic consequences of managers' risk preference and audit quality;(2)Help listed companies improve the risk of managers Qualitative and risk response capabilities to establish a senior management appointment system;(3)Help to improve the executive management mechanism by optimizing the corporate governance structure and establishing a diverse compensation system.(4)It is beneficial for the external auditing supervision of enterprises to restrict corporate behavior,improve corporate information transparency and protect the interests of investors through management risk preference.