Executive Compensation,Effectiveness Of Internal Control And Quality Of Accounting Information

Accounting information can produce certain economic consequences.Legal and compliant accounting information can help investors to make favorable investment decisions,thus playing a role in standardizing the capital market.At the same time,legal and compliant accounting information can help managers make correct business decisions and make enterprises develop healthily.However,in recent years,financial frauds led by the senior management of listed companies have become a common occurrence with bad social impact and have become the focus of all stakeholders in the capital market.Practice has proved that moderate executive compensation incentive can effectively reduce corporate financial fraud,so it is very important to establish a reasonable compensation incentive system.One of the objectives of internal control is to reasonably ensure the reliability of accounting information.Therefore,there is also a close relationship between the effectiveness of internal control and the quality of accounting information.This article is divided into 6 parts.First of all,referring to the relevant research of previous scholars,this paper uses the normative research method to analyze the previous literature,and determines the impact of executive compensation incentives on the quality of accounting information as the starting point for research.After that,this paper adopts the method of empirical research,taking the quality of accounting information as the explanatory variable,the executive compensation incentive as the explanatory variable,and adding the effectiveness of internal control as the intermediary variable.Then,this paper empirically analyzes the relationship between corporate executive compensation,internal control effectiveness and accounting information quality,based on the 2014-2017 Shenzhen Stock Exchange's main board A-share listed company as a research sample,through descriptive statistics,Stata13.0 software correlation analysis and regression analysis and robustness test.Finally,the following conclusions are drawn:(1)executive compensation incentive plays a promoting role in improving the quality of accounting information;(2)Salary incentives for senior executives are conducive to improving the effectiveness of internal control;(3)Executive compensation incentive can indirectly affect the quality of accounting information through internal control,and the effectiveness of internal control plays an intermediary role in the relationship between executive compensation incentives and the quality of accounting information.The innovation of this paper lies in the fact that when studying the relationship between executive compensation incentive and accounting information quality,internal control effectiveness is added in it as intermediate variable.And the partial intermediate effect of internal control effectiveness in the relationship between executive compensation incentive and accounting information quality is tested by using the stepwise regression test method.The logical relationship between the three is empirically analyzed,instead of focusing on the relationship between the two of three,like the previous study.The deficiency lies in that the research on executive incentive is limited to executive monetary compensation incentive,but no research has been carried out on other incentive forms.