Research On Moral Hazard And Its Countermeasures Of Commercial Banks Under The Deposit Insurance System In China

The deposit insurance system is an important part of a country’s financial safety net.In order to protect the interests of the depositors,it strengthens and stabilizes the depositors’confidence in the bank’s credit,thus obstructing the contagion of the risk in the financial market and finally achieving the role of stabilizing the financial market.In May 1,2015,China formally established the explicit deposit insurance system,and ended the implicit deposit system which has implemented in our countries for 20 years.This financial reform is of great significance to the improvement of our financial safety netAccording to international experience and related theories,the deposit insurance system can stabilize the financial market,but its inherent moral hazard problems also bring a certain negative impact The existing research shows that the deposit insurance system has aggravated the moral hazard of the bank.The national implicit guarantee system which has been implemented in our country for a long time has made the moral risk of the Bank of our country more serious.Therefore,how to prevent the moral hazard of the deposit insurance system is an important issue in the field of financial supervision and regulation.It is also one of the problems to be solved urgently in China’s current deposit insurance system.This paper takes the moral hazard problem of China’s commercial banks as the breakthrough point,the main purpose is to verify the main reason that the transformation of the model of deposit insurance system in China can reduce the moral risk of the bank to a certain extent and straighten up the reason why explicit can reduce the moral hazard,than combined with successful experience in the world,some suggestions are put forward to prevent bank’s moral hazard in deposit insurance system.First of all,in order to analyze the impact of the deposit insurance system on the bank’s moral risk in the light of China’s national conditions,this paper has carried out some related research with the methods of literature research,comparative analysis,empirical research and so on.Through the study of the historical evolution of China’s deposit insurance system and the analysis of the risk and causes of the moral hazard in the implicit deposit insurance,the paper theoretically demonstrates that the change of deposit insurance mode can reduce bank’s moral hazard,but this effect is a certain limitation.Secondly,through the panel data of 16 listed banks,this paper,shows that the transformation of China’s deposit insurance model can reduce the moral hazard of the bank by empirical analysis,and the direct effect of the deposit insurance model on reducing the moral risk of banks’liabilities and assets is strengthened and weakened by the improvement of the bank’s capital level respectively.That is to say,there is"mediation effect"and"cover effect".In addition,the empirical results also show that the current explicit deposit insurance has little economic impact on reducing the moral hazard of banks.Finally,combined with international experience,this paper puts forward some preventive measures against the possible moral hazard problems in China’s initial deposit insurance system.These countermeasures are mainly discussed in two aspects:improving the content of the deposit insurance system and optimizing the operation environment of the external system.