| As the ultimate decision makers of the company,executives play a vital role in the business management process.However,since the outbreak of the global financial crisis,the ups and downs of executive compensation performance and the phenomenon of high compensation have been a sensitive issue for the public.In the period of rapid economic development and macroeconomics,merger and acquisitions(M&A)activities are becoming more frequent.The period of rapid economic growth is usually when the economic structure and the enterprise structure need to be adjusted to meet the needs of economic development.and restructuring by enterprise M&A is a market-oriented approach.M&A expand the size of a company,and with its complexity,it increases the difficulty level of management,resulting in executives having to put in extra effort and this provides a good opportunity for management’s opportunism.With the introduction of manager power hypothesis,many scholars have found that manager power can explain to some extent the phenomenon of salary difference.Based on this,this paper studies the relationship between manager power and executive compensation,and introduces the decision-making behavior of corporate M&A under the influence of manager power.Under the influence of manager power,as decision-makers of the company,will key executives use their power to set compensation level?What are executives’motives in engaging in M&A frequently?What is the effect mechanism between three factors?Taking into consideration that the different property rights of M&A may affect executive compensation,this paper further compares and analyzes the self-interest behavior of executives between state-owned enterprises and private enterprises.The paper takes executive compensation as the springboard,manager power as the starting point,and the implementation of corporate M&A behavior as the assessment path to study key management compensation mechanism.Based on the sample size of 4.726 listed companies engaged in M&A from year 2009 to 2016.using principal-agent theory,based on the research results in China and abroad,we explored the three factor relationship effective mechanism among manager power.corporate M&A and key executive compensation.Based on the research,the following main conclusions are drawn:1.The greater the power of management.the higher the key executive compensation:2.The greater the power of management.the more frequent M&A occur.but the smaller the scale of M&A:3.The greater the power of management,the more executives can increase their compensation through frequent M&A and large-scale M&A activities;at the same time,the incentives for management to "seek rent" in private enterprises are stronger than those in state-owned enterprises.According to the research results,this paper puts forth the following suggestions:1.Strengthen the board’s control over the company,clarify the functions of independent directors,and improve the corporate governance structure,so that the company can effectively avoid conspiracy between the board and management.2.To address the issue of over-investment behavior of executives under the influence of manager power due to the lack of supervision mechanisms,establish a major investment activity supervision mechanism.and monitor the role of the media.3.Optimize the executive compensation structure and performance evaluation mechanism,and incentive executives to make decisions that maximize shareholders’interests and limit the executives’self-interest behavior. |
