Research On The Relationship Between The Pledge Of Large Shareholders' Equity And The Corporate Value Of Listed Companies

In recent years,with the increasing demand of large shareholders for financing,the scale of equity pledge of Listed Companies in China is increasing.Equity pledge can alleviate the financing constraints of major shareholders and listed companies,and become a tool to promote the development of listed companies.However,due to the high proportion of pledge by major shareholders,the risk of equity pledge business is gathered,and the stock market is bursting constantly,which causes investors' panic.What role does the pledge of major shareholders play in the capital market deserve our further discussion.To be sure,a certain proportion of equity pledge can help major shareholders and listed companies to ease financing constraints,but also may reduce the motivation of major shareholders to encroach on the interests of listed companies by other means,thus promoting the value of enterprises.But on the other hand,when large shareholders pledge in high proportion,the degree of separation of power and the increase of risk of control transfer may "stimulate" the self-interest of large shareholders,especially when large shareholders realize that they will lose control,they may further encroach on the interests of small and medium shareholders and damage the value of enterprises.Therefore,the study of the relationship between the pledge of large shareholders' equity and the corporate value of listed companies is of great significance to guide people to treat the pledge of equity rationally.Based on the principal-agent theory,information asymmetry,control theory and corporate governance theory,this paper divides the pledge of large shareholders' equity into two dimensions: behavior and ratio.It studies the specific impact of pledge on the corporate value of listed companies,and chooses internal control and media attention as moderating variables to study their moderating effect on the relationship between them.This paper chooses A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from 2012 to 2016 as samples for empirical research.The main conclusions are as follows:(1)The pledge behavior of major shareholders has a positive impact on the corporate value of listed companies;(2)There is a non-linear inverted "U" relationship between the pledge ratio of major shareholders and the corporate value of listed companies;(3)The better the internal control is,the stronger the positive relationship between the pledge of large shareholders' equity and the value of the enterprise.(4)The moderating effect of internal control on the relationship between the pledge ratio of major shareholders and enterprise value is remarkable,which is as follows: when the pledge level is low,the better the internal control is,the stronger the promotion of the pledge of major shareholders to enterprise value;when the pledge level is high,the better the internal control is,the weaker the embezzlement effect of the pledge of major shareholders to enterprise value is;(5)The media pays attention to the positive relationship between the pledge of large shareholders' equity and corporate value.(6)The moderating effect of media attention on the proportion of pledge of major shareholders and corporate value is significant.The specific performance is: when the level of pledge is low,media attention can enhance the promotion of corporate value by pledge of major shareholders;when the level of pledge is high,media attention can restrain the embezzlement of corporate value by pledge of major shareholders.