Research On Restricted Stock Incentives Of State-owned Listed Companies

Under the modern enterprise principal-agent system,the enterprise ownership and management separation,the interests of the owners and managers to pursue different goals,and special double agent in state-owned listed companies,cause the agency problem is more serious in the state-owned enterprises of China.Therefore,the owner must take some measures to avoid the loss resulting from this,and the equity incentive comes into being.Equity incentive makes managers take risks as shareholders and share profits and achieve win-win cooperation.Since the financial crisis,the drawbacks of traditional stock options have emerged,and the advantages of restricted stock incentives have been highlighted.It is favored by enterprises to retain core talents during the enterprise crisis.Firstly,this paper briefly summarizes the development history of the real equity incentive of state-owned listed companies in China and analyzes the overall situation of restricted stock equity incentive.Then in baosteel group,for example,to analyze the restrictive equity incentive plan,through the analysis of the effect of equity incentive plan,measure of restricted stock incentive effect indexes selected the relevant financial indicators,shareholder's net assets and market value at the same time,analyses the problems existing in the restricted stock incentive schemes,such as the lack of a reasonable performance evaluation,the internal supervision mechanism is not perfect and other internal problems and professional managers lack of competition,imperfect relevant legal policy,and the external problems,such as weak effectiveness in our stock market,baosteel group restricted stock incentive effect is not obvious.This paper puts forward some constructive Suggestions for the rational design of restricted stock incentive scheme for state-owned listed companies in China.