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A Study Of Stock Incentive Compensation Based On Property Right Change

Posted on:2019-12-18Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:H X ZhaoFull Text:PDF
GTID:2439330563452895Subject:Accounting
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In the early 1950 s,the United States started equity incentive,and many developed countries began to carry out equity incentive schemes.In 1990 s,China began to implement the equity incentive scheme,and then it began to enter the exploration stage of equity incentive.After that,China Securities Regulatory Commission promulgated the "equity incentive management approach",and most of the listed companies have split share structure reform,and established a certain institutional environment for equity incentive implementation.At this point,equity incentive has entered the stage of development.At present,there are many empirical analysis about the implementation effect and influencing factors of equity incentive based on exogenous and endogenous perspective.Only a small number of case literature studies the impact of property right on the design of equity incentive system from the perspective of property right change.However,the nature of the company's property right is different from that of the principal-agent relationship and the corresponding corporate governance mechanism,which will affect the design and implementation effect of the equity incentive system.This paper uses the case study method and the literature review method to review the domestic and foreign equity incentive literature,and analyzes in detail the basis and implementation status of equity incentive theory,and on this basis,carries out the implementation of equity incentives under different property rights.The analysis,that is,an analysis of the incentive model,incentive target,incentive term,and incentive conditions of the nature of state-owned property rights and the nature of private property rights.Judging from the implementation of equity incentives in China,the equity incentive system in China is becoming more and more complete,and more listed companies have implemented equity incentives.This paper analyzes the three equity incentives before and after the change of Shanghai Jahwa's property rights,and discovers the differences in the design,motivation and implementation effect of Shanghai Jahwa's equity incentive scheme under different property rights.Shanghai Jahwa under state-owned control,due to policy restrictions and excessive external supervision,the effect of equity incentives is not obvious,with a narrow range of incentive targets,low grant prices,shorter duration of inspections,and a single exercise condition.After Shanghai Jahwa changed its property rights in 2011,it changed from a state-owned enterprise to a private enterprise.Under the private nature,the two equity incentives implemented by Shanghai Jahwa are significantly higher than the incentive targets of state-owned equity incentives in 2006.The granted prices are more biased toward market prices,the number of years of inspection increases,the conditions for exercising rights increase,and the stock incentive scheme is designed more.rationalization.This article analyzes the share price of Shanghai Jahwa's equity incentive after the implementation of the event research method and analyzes the company's performance based on the company's financial data in recent years.This article analyzes the personnel retention after Shanghai Jahwa's equity incentive.Finally,this article concludes the case of Shanghai Jahwa's equity incentives and draws conclusions and obtains the enlightenment from the implementation of equity incentives by companies with different property rights.Through the case study of Shanghai Jahwa,we draw conclusions and inspirations.From the perspective of equity incentive plan design,Shanghai Jahwa's equity incentive under the state-owned nature is more like the compensation system arrangement made by management for the sake of welfare.Shanghai Jahwa's equity incentives have more incentives.Judging from the status of retention,Shanghai Jahwa's equity incentives in the state-owned period have played a better role in attracting talents to retain talents,while Shanghai Jahwa's stock incentives have no obvious effect on attracting talents to retain talents.Judging from the company's performance,equity incentives have a significant improvement on the company's performance and stock prices.For state-owned enterprises,enterprises should improve their governance structure,design reasonable equity incentive plans and pay more attention to the supervision of independent directors.For private enterprises,enterprises should formulate a diversified equity incentive plan,strive to expand the range of incentive targets,and give full play to the oversight functions of accounting firms.This article expects to provide reference for selecting and designing a scientific and effective equity incentive plan for listed companies under different property rights.
Keywords/Search Tags:Equity Incentives, Property Right Change, Conceptual Design, Implementation Effect
PDF Full Text Request
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