| In real life,the participants in the economic activities are generally connected,and the auction is no exception.In the auction,the value of most auction items is different to the different bidder.In addition,economic activities are full of risks,the bidders will exhibit different risk attributes,risk aversion is one of the important types;for the seller,in order to avoid the risk of low transaction,the seller will set the reserve price on the basis of expectation to prevent the loss.In the territorial resources auction,the interaction between the real estate agents is frequent.The seller can set the threshold of the auction and create a certain auction atmosphere according to the characteristics of the bidder in order to make the final transaction price more reasonable.Therefore,the model is established to analyze the impact of different factors on the final bid price from the point of view of the bidder,so as to give some guidance to the auction of state-owned land resources.Based on the above analysis,this paper establishes a theoretical model,which has certain practical and theoretical values.This paper introduces the reserve price and the utility function of the risk aversion under the auctions with interdependent values.We study how the bidders effect their bidding strategies when they are risk aversion and whether the risk aversion change the relationship between the bidding strategies and reserve price under the first-price sealed auctions and the second-price sealed auctions.Then we get the following conclusions:(1)In the first-price sealed auctions,the equilibrium strategy of the risk aversion and the reserve prices are positive correlation;(2)In the second-price sealed auctions,the equilibrium strategy of the risk aversion reduces with the increase of the reserve prices;(3)In the first-price sealed auctions,risk aversion causes an reduce in equilibrium bids;(4)In the second-price sealed auctions,the equilibrium strategy is unaffected by risk aversion. |
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