| Under the balanced fiscal policy,financial funds are purposefully shifted from central government to locality,and more to less developed regions of western China.However,are these windfalls of fiscal resources significantly beneficial to local society?This is the key to evaluate intergovernmental relationships and policies such as transfers.Therefore,through theoretical and empirical analysis this article tries to study following questions:1)Under fiscal decentralization system,is there any evidence of fiscal resource curse?2)What is the mechanism of political resource curse?Based on Seven-Year Priority Poverty Alleviation Program,this paper will use Regression Discontinuity Designs to explore the existence and mechanism of fiscal resource curse.In this article,fiscal resource curse refers to the phenomenon that a windfall of government revenues exacerbates the political agency problem and deteriorates the results of policies.The empirical results show that under the fiscal decentralization system,fiscal resource curse does exist.In addition,county-level finance has obvious expenditure bias,and transfer payments have different impacts on different areas of government expenditure.And,this paper argues that fiscal expenditure may be a channel for transfer payment to aggravate the irregularities of public officials,playing an intermediary role in the curse mechanism of financial resources.Compared with the existing research,the biggest contribution of this paper is to analyze the relationship betveen fiscal resource capture capacity and the behavior of officials from the perspective of fiscal resource curse.It can enrich the study on policy effect of Priority Poverty Alleviation Program.And by analyzing the mechanism of fisical resource curse,it can better guide the central in regulating the distribution of transfer,supervision and administration on expenditure,and having practical significance for reducing the renting space of officials. |
PDF Full Text Request