| Agency theory always takes executive compensation as a tool to align the Interests between executives and shareholders.however,the effect of executive compensation on shareholders hasn’t been attention to until recent years.The groundbreaking research by Fama and Miller shows that the Shareholders are motivated to strip creditor’s wealth through high-risk investment.That is,Shareholders will invest in high-risk projects at the expense of the losses incurred by creditors.This phenomenon is often referred to as risk transfer or asset replacement.At the same time,more and more research literature and corporate governance practices have shown that when the shareholder passes executive compensation to align the executives with their own interests,it may also affect the creditor’s decision-making,that is,creditors will consider signals from executive payouts.Executive can affect not only creditors’ decision-making,but also executives’ choices of debt contracts,thereby affecting corporate debt financing ultimately.This paper adopts the method of qualitative research and quantitative research.This article is based on the following ideas:firstly,based on the combing of related literature at home and abroad,as well as the definition of related concepts and theoretical analysis,than propose the hypothesis of this paper.secondly,select China’s listed companies from 2013 to 2016 as samples,construct the model to the executive cash compensation,equity incentives and debt maturity structure,using statistical software STATA.14.0 to carry on empirical analysis.Finally, according to the results of the empirical analysis,we draw the conclusions,further analysis of the enlightenment and policy recommendations,and reflect on the shortcomings of this article,for further prospects.The research results show that different types of executive compensation have different effects on the maturity structure of debt.details as follows:First,the impact of executive cash compensation on the maturity structure of debt is inverted "U".Second,compared with the companies without equity incentives,those with equity incentives have relatively low long-term debt.Third,the strength of equity incentives is negatively correlated with the debt maturity structure.Therefore,in formulating the executive compensation system,it is necessary to comprehensively weigh the interests of all parties,formulate a scientific and reasonable remuneration system,give full play to the positive incentive role of the remuneration system and send positive signals to external investors. |
