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Research On The Risk And Supervision Of P2P Online Lending Platform

Posted on:2018-07-11Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:X ChenFull Text:PDF
GTID:2439330512989488Subject:Industrial Economics
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
P2P Online lending is a new financial business combines P2 P lending and the Internet together,It is very important to improve China's financial system,make up the funding gap of small and medium-sized enterprises and alleviate the investment and financing needs.P2 P Online lending in the process of development,although the rapid expansion of the number of platform,the turnover of high-speed growth,the platform is constantly exposed to the risk of frequent run away,cash difficulties and other risk events,has seriously affected the healthy development of P2 P Online lending.Due to the current domestic platform for the regulation is not in place,so from the platform of the frequent problems of this problem,on the basis of the research of the causes and performance of the risk to produce effective regulatory measures is necessary.P2P Online lending platform plays a role of information intermediary in the process of lending transactions,and it is an important bridge for investors and borrowers to complete the borrowing of funds.In the lending process,investors are essentially to entrust their investment demand to the platform,platform instead of investors for review and loan project supervision,principal-agent relationship between the investor and the Online lending platform.This paper constructs the principal-agent theory,analyzes the optimal effort level of symmetric information and asymmetric information platform under two kinds of conditions in the process of providing services,found in the case of asymmetric information,the process of Online lending platform to provide services to investors,for their own benefit to improve the motivation,choose to reduce the effort level due diligence responsibilities before the loan,information audit,information disclosure,loan management and other aspects of moral hazard.On the basis of theoretical analysis,constructed the P2 P Online lending platform risk index system,using principal component analysis of influence level of each index on the platform risk calculation method,found that the influence of the main explanatory variables on the platform that is a significant risk,before the loan platform information audit,information disclosure,management and other aspects of the loan after moral risk behavior effects on the platform risk significantly,andthen verify the conclusion of theoretical analysis shows that,the moral risk of platform is the main reason leading to the problem of frequent platform.According to the causes of P2 P Online lending platform risk and the main performance,combined with the results of empirical analysis,the supervision P2 P Online lending platform,mainly to reduce the information asymmetry between investors and Online lending platform,Online lending platform supervision behavior,reduce the moral hazard of the platform.Therefore put forward the following countermeasures: to establish information disclosure supervision standard unified,improve the transparency of the Online lending platform,reduce the information asymmetry between the two sides;promote the Online lending platform operation process compliance,directly regulate the Online lending platform behavior;incentive constraint system constraint platform to establish the platform reputation mechanism,introduce the third party guarantee implicit behavior in addition;supervision of the construction of constrained platform construction also cannot do without with the support of the foundation of the credit environment,establish and improve the net loan industry credit system,establish and improve the supervision and self-discipline framework of Online lending.
Keywords/Search Tags:P2P Online lending platform, Principal-agent theory, Risk, Regulation
PDF Full Text Request
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