Research On Preventing Irrational Behavior From Manipulating Conditions In Multi-stage Cooperative Games

In the process of dynamic cooperative games,irrational behavior will appear for various reasons,which will lead to the breakdown of cooperation.Irrational-behavior-proof condition(IBP)is an important way to maintain stable cooperation in dynamic cooperative games.However,IBP is not necessarily true.The dissertation focuses on the study of irrational-behavior-proof condition(IBP)in dynamic cooperative games.Aiming at the deterministic and stochastic multi-stage cooperative games,a method of constructing the transformed characteristic function is proposed to ensure the establishment of IBP,so that every player will not take irrational behavior and give up cooperation at any time.The main work of this paper includes:First of all,in the deterministic multi-stage cooperative game,we study the relationship among three kinds of irrational-behavior-proof conditions.By a counterexample,we show that IBP doesn't hold,which leads to the failure of cooperation.Based on a kind of limit characteristic function,we prove that irrational-behavior-proof conditions always hold in the transformed game.Then,in the deterministic multi-stage cooperative game,we define the general transformation of characteristic function,and prove that irrational-behavior-proof conditions hold in the transformed game.Next,considering the stochastic multi-stage game,the randomness is given by the event tree exogenous,we define four kinds of irrational-behavior-proof conditions and give the corresponding general characteristic function,we prove that irrational-behavior-proof conditions hold in the transformed game.Finally,we study the application of cooperative pollution control problem and establish the game model of cooperative pollution control over an event tree.Through a computable numerical example,we verify that irrational-behavior-proof conditions hold,which can make the national players achieve effective long-term cooperation.Thus,an effective mechanism is established to prevent the manipulation of irrational behaviors of participating countries in the implementation of international climate agreements.