An Empirical Study Of Inefficient Investment Based On Corporate Internal Governance

As an important part of the financial decision of the enterprise,the investment decision is an important guarantee for the enterprise to realize the maximum of its own value.However,with the continuous development of enterprises,there are more and more serious separation of the two powers and incomplete contract theory in the company's internal management,which results in inefficient investment and excessive investment in the face of major investment decisions.A good corporate governance can use the articles of association to stipulate the powers and responsibilities of the board of directors,shareholders,managers and other stakeholders,so as to ensure that investment is more rational and make it more consistent with the long-term interests of enterprises and the country.At the same time,in view of the fact that most of the existing literatures on the Shanghai and Shenzhen two city or state holding listed companies as research samples,according to a specific field of industry especially textile industry research literature is less,so this paper textile industry analysis theory and empirical effect of internal governance of listed companies on non efficiency investment.In this paper,as the research sample data of listed companies to 2012-2016 in the textile industry,using Richardson model to measure the residual 39 textile industry listed companies' non efficient investment level,will be 195 observations according to the positive and negative residual into excessive investment and insufficient investment group,from the internal governance mechanism of ownership structure,the system of independent directors and management whether the motivation can be non efficiency investment constraints of the enterprises through empirical analysis,can serve to reduce the enterprise over investment or under investment effect.The results show that: at present,China's textile industry listed companies do not have effective investment behavior,and the phenomenon of under-investment is more serious than that of over-investment.Ownership structure:Listed Companies in China's textile industry dominance phenomenon is more serious,equity balance did not play a substantive effect of governance,the second to the tenth largest shareholders is difficult to constrain the inefficient investment behavior;governance of the board of directors: the proportion of independent directors,manager of the twopositions of the non efficiency investment inhibition a significant,and the expansion of the board will aggravate the inefficient investment;management incentive: the management equity incentive inhibitory effect on the non efficiency of investment is not significant,but the management of monetary incentive can inhibit the non efficiency investment effect.According to the empirical results,put forward the following suggestions: improve the institutional investors and individual stocks,the implementation of diversified ownership structure;the appropriate control of the size of the board,increasing the proportion of independent directors,to improve the quality of board members;establish the evaluation standard reasonable salary index,improve the incentive mechanism and supervision mechanism.