Study On The Prevention Mechanism Of Double-sided Moral Hazard In The Operation Of Sewage Treatment PPP Project

In recent years,China's economy has developed rapidly.In order to meet the growing demand of urban construction,PPP mode is widely used in sewage treatment projects.With the construction and operation of social capital,the source of government funds is widened,the financial pressure is relieved,the market road of sewage treatment industry has been opened,and the efficiency of sewage service has been improved.However,due to the long operation cycle,asymmetric information,incomplete contract and uncertainty of external environment of the PPP project of sewage treatment,There is a bilateral moral hazard in the project operation period,that is,both government and private investors with private information are likely to damage the interests of others in order to increase their own profits.This leads to the failure of the project and the failure to achieve the effectiveness of the PPP mode.In view of the above background,how to effectively prevent the bilateral moral hazard in the operation period of the sewage treatment PPP project,and guide the government and private investors to actively manage the project,is particularly important.Therefore,on the basis of the qualitative analysis of the causes and performance of the moral risk of the government and private investors in the operation period,this paper establishes the evolutionary game model between the public and private parties under different circumstances.The equilibrium solution is analyzed,and the concrete precautions are put forward.The main contents are as follows:(1)Through related literature research,the operation process and organization structure of sewage treatment PPP project are summarized.Based on the responsibilities of the public and private parties in the operation period,this paper analyzes the sources and manifestations of the moral hazard of the government and private investors.(2)In view of the moral hazard behavior of private investors in the project operation period,the government acts as a public interest representative to supervise private investors,and private investors seek to maximize their own interests.The evolutionary game model of public and private parties is established,and the evolutionary stable state under different parameter ranges is analyzed.Suggestions are put forwards in view of the private investors' moral hazard.(3)In view of the government's moral hazard behavior during the project operation period,in some cases,the government is also "economic man" and will also pursue its own interests.Assuming that both parties are in the project operation to obtain their own benefits,an evolutionary game model between the government and private investors is established.To solve the behavior strategies under different value ranges,a precautionary mechanism is proposed to regulate the government's dishonest behavior.(4)The evolution of government and private investors is difficult to achieve the optimal state of cooperation without the third party agencies,which requires external incentives and constraints.Therefore,on the basis of the above models,the third party regulatory agencies are introduced to analyze the effective parameter range of suppressing the moral hazard behaviors of both the public and private parties.