A Study On The Influence Of Managerial Entrenchment On Transparency Of Accounting Information

Accounting information is a communication tool between enterprise and capital market.Its transparency is directly related to the efficiency of capital market.However,at present,one of the important factors hindering the healthy development of China's capital market is the opaque accounting information.In order to give full play to the function of the securities market,how to improve the transparency of accounting information is a matter of great concern to investors.To tackle this problem,it is needed to go deep into the process of accounting information generation,and analyze the underlying causes of low transparency of accounting information.Information asymmetry and incomplete contracts often arise between managers and owners.Driven by the management defense motivation,managers may make decisions that deviate from the interests of shareholders.This is reflected in the disclosure of accounting information by concealing and whitewashing the adverse information which is unfavourable to the managers' positions and reducing the transparency of accounting information.In addition,the majority of the ownership structure of listed companies has the ultimate controller.They often control the resources and decision-making behavior of the underlying listed companies through the structure of Pyramid or cross shareholding.Such a phenomenon of "different rights of the same shares" may make their interest claims inconsistent with the overall interests of the listed companies.Based on this,the self--interest motivation of the enterprise managers is the root of the transparency of the accounting information,and the financial information reported by the manager only can be reported through the approval of the ultimate shareholders,which also gives them the opportunity to adjust the transparency of the accounting information.Therefore,as the provider of accounting information,managers directly affect the transparency of accounting information.Under the control of the ultimate shareholders,the ultimate controllers of different properties and characteristics have different profit motivations in view of the "motivation impacts behavior".This will undoubtedly regulate the manipulation of managerial defense motivation to the transparency of accounting information in different directions and degrees.It is analyzed how managerial entrenchment motivation affect the transparency of accounting information,and on this basis,it is explored the moderating effect of the ultimate controller's properties and characteristics on the relationship between the two.First of all,the definition of the research question is defined,including the managerial entrenchment,the transparency of accounting information and the ultimate control power.Secondly,based on the elaboration of the relevant theories,it is summarized the research results of scholars both at home and abroad,and the breakthrough point of the research is summed up.Based on this,the A-Share Listed Companies in th,e two major stock markets of Shanghai and Shenzhen stock market in year 2009-2016 are used as the research samples,and the panel data are replaced in the regression model for empirical test.The results of the empirical study show that the stronger the degree of managerial defenses,the lower the transparency of the accounting information in the listed companies of China's main board,and compared with the managers under the actual control of the non-state-owned enterprises,the managers'managerial defense under the actual control of state-owned enterprises is more motivated to reduce the transparency of accounting information,which confirms the urgency of the reform of the mixed ownership of the state-owned enterprises;both ultimate control and cash flow rights are negative to the relationship between the managerial defense and the transparency of the accounting information,reflecting the "benefit convergence effect" of ultimate controlling shareholders;the degree of separation of two power positively regulates the relationship between the managerial entrenchment and the transparency of the accounting information and reflects the "interest embezzlement effect" of ultimate controlling shareholders.Finally,according to the results of the empirical test and the current situation of the development of Listed Companies in the special capital market environment of our country,the countermeasures and suggestions are given to improve the transparency of accounting information disclosed by enterprises from the aspects of improving the management mechanism of managers and improving the controlling structure of the ultimate controller.