| The default of 11 Tianwei MTN2 bond that happened in April,2015 broke the long standing “rigid payment” phenomenon in China's bond market.Tianwei Group,the issue company,has become the first state-owned enterprise that occurred bond default and entered the bankruptcy reorganization proceedings because of insolvency.However,is Tianwei Group's bond default and bankruptcy simply caused by insolvency due to the serious loss because of the deterioration of industry operating environment? What role did the controlling shareholders,Bingzhuang Group,play behind the bond default?This paper takes Tianwei Group as an example,based on the theory of principal-agent and information asymmetry.It is found out that,due to the motivation of saving the shell resource which in two years' continuous loss,the controlling shareholder,Bingzhuang Group replaced Tianwei Group's electric transmission and transformation assets with Baobian Dianqi's new energy assets.And Bingzhuang Group became Baobian Dianqi's controlling shareholder instead of Tianwei Group through capital operation.This behavior made Tianwei Group lost the hope of returning to the right track and infringed on the interests of the bond investors.According to the analysis results,this paper proposes to restrain the predatory behavior of major shareholders and strengthen the protection of bond investors by optimize the guarantee clause of debt service in bond contracts and perfecting the bondholders' meeting system. |