Neutral Welfare Effect Of Mobile Internet Market Network

With the popularization and application of smart phones,the rapid development of 4G networks and the advent of 5G era,the mobile Internet market has developed rapidly in recent years.Compared with the traditional Internet market,some Internet companies such as Google,Baidu,Tencent and other content providers have emerged as new Market forces gradually occupied the dominant position in the market,and telecom operators,in order to provide only intermediary platforms for network access services,have undergone great changes in business models and competitive models in the market.With the change of the market competition model,some unfavorable competition phenomena continue to grow.For example,some content providers and telecommunication operators privately make contracts to obtain priority access channels,and some telecom operators provide certain content for their own benefit.Business access takes a price discrimination approach.These malicious acts will seriously hinder the healthy development of the mobile Internet market.In order to curb these unfavorable competition behaviors,the concept of network neutrality came into being.This paper combines the current research status of network neutrality,based on the theory of two-sided markets,constructs the Hotelling model under the monopoly and competition market structures respectively,and compares and analyzes the game equilibrium solutions to explore the issue of network neutral social welfare effects.The study found that under the monopoly and competition market structure,network neutrality will increase the profit of content providers and reduce consumer surplus.For the operator platform,unlike the competition platform market,network neutrality under the monopoly platform market will reduce the profit of the operator platform.For the total social welfare level,under both markets,network neutrality will increase the total social welfare level within certain parameters.In addition,it was also found that when an operator's platform shifts from network-neutral pricing to non-neutral network pricing,the operator platform has a willingness to reduce the price of mobile user traffic,thus achieving the purpose of discriminatory access pricing for content providers.And the level of profit of content providers and the pricing power of carrier platforms for mobile phone users are directly proportional to the basic utility that operators can provide.In addition to the theoretical model analysis,this article also takes China Mobile as an entry point to the Tencent charging event to discuss the reasons for the non-neutrality of the network in the actual market and its impact.The analysis shows that the change of the business model is the main reason leading to this charge dispute.Although non-neutral pricing may give mobile operators additional revenue from access fees,it does not necessarily have a positive impact on overall social welfare from the perspective of total social welfare.Finally,combined with the research conclusions of this paper,we propose the development of China's mobile Internet market,including reviewing and formulating relevant regulatory policies,establishing an independent regulatory agency,regulating the access and withdrawal mechanisms of content providers in the market,and accelerating the interconnection between operators.Regulations such as interoperability hope to contribute to the continued healthy development of China's mobile Internet market.