VC Firm Performance Evaluation And Incentiv Mechanism

Venture capital is mainly based on high-tech industry investment,which has the characteristics of high risk,high investment,high return and long cycle.As the principal agent of the venture capitalists,the venture capitalists are responsible for the funds of the venture capitalists.The efforts and working ability of the venture capitalists have a direct impact on the success or failure of the venture capital funds.The scale of venture capital industry in China is continually too large,but the performance appraisal and incentive mechanism for venture capitalists are still lagging behind.Only by establishing a suitable performance evaluation system for venture capitalists in China and screening out effective incentive mechanism,can we improve the work of venture capitalists in China.No matter for venture capital family member system and domestic economic industrial upgrading,it has practical significance.In recent years,the relevant research found that the incentive mechanism for venture capitalists mainly includes four aspects:fixed income,follow-up ratio,bonus share and reputation level,but the literature focused on a single dimension of research,so this paper chose to compare the effectiveness of different incentive mechanisms as the research direction.Through empirical research,this paper constructs a performance evaluation system for venture capitalists,establishes a multiple linear regression model between the performance of venture capitalists and different incentive mechanisms,compares and analyzes the effectiveness of different incentive mechanisms,and provides relevant suggestions and Countermeasures for the venture capital industry and the government.It is found that the current efforts of venture capitalists in China are not affected by fixed wages,bonus share ratio and reputation level,which may be related to the development level of venture capital industry in China.The relative compliance process of venture capital funds in China is still insufficient,leading to the increase of the bonus share ratio of venture capitalists.We can't improve their labor enthusiasm,because whether they can get bonus under long-term conditions can't be guaranteed properly;the fixed income level of venture capitalists in our country can't affect their enthusiasm for work;the increase of fixed income level will only aggravate the burden of venture capital enterprises,but can't bring good performance returns.It is basically consistent with the theoretical model;reputation level in China can not affect the degree of effort of venture capitalists,which is related to the inconsistency of reputation evaluation of venture capitalists in China.The personal evaluation of venture capitalists is out of touch with social evaluation and corporate evaluation.In addition,the follow-up incentive mechanism helps to enhance the degree of effort of venture capitalists,but the personal financing channels of venture capitalists in China are limited,and the amount of project investment is too large,exceeding their personal affordability,resulting in some of the incentive effect overshoot,resulting in potential project risks.On the basis of this conclusion,some suggestions are put forward as a supplement to the incentive mechanism of venture capital industry in China.