Institutional Investors:Active Overseer VS.Insider Trader

How to effectively solve the agency conflict between management and shareholders,large shareholders and small shareholders is always the core theme of corporate governance research.With the continuous growth of professional institutional investors,the positive role of institutional investors in solving corporate governance problems has drawn much attention from the theoretical and practical circles.On the one hand,previous studies have found that institutional investors play an active role as a supervisor of corporate governance in countries where stock ownership is dispersed.On the other hand,because of the principal-agent problem of institutional investors,the role of corporate governance has also been questioned.In China,the stock ownership of the listed companies is relatively concentrated.The outstanding performance of the principal-agent problem is the conflict of interests between the large shareholders and the small and medium shareholders,and can institutional investors play an active role in supervising the corporate governance?Or do institutional investors conspire with major shareholders to seize the interests of minority shareholders?This paper examines the role of institutional investors in 2012-2016 year oriented GEM listed companies,and examines the role of institutional investors in the orienteering,and uses event research to investigate the market response to the participation of institutional investors,and to investigate the participation of institutional investors through single variable test and multiple linear regression.Whether the increase has significantly improved the performance of the company.The results are as follows:(1)the response of the market to the institutional investors' participation in the directional increase is not obvious compared with the sample of non institutional participation,indicating that the market does not fully identify the role of institutional investors in the directing issuance.After the announcement,the significant positive response of the market to a certain extent indicates the institutional investment.The investors obtained a short and considerable profit by the insider information;(2)the market reaction and the square of the institutional investors' subscription ratio showed a positive U relationship,indicating that the market thought that the corporate investors could play an active corporate governance role with the increase in the subscription ratio of institutional investors,and(3)use the net lag phase.As an agent variable of corporate performance,asset return has found that institutional investors' participation in private placement does not significantly enhance the performance of the underlying company.Based on the conclusion of the study,this paper holds that institutional investors do not play an active supervisory role in directional issuance.On the contrary,institutional investors have obtained objective short-term gains by means of insider information.At the same time,this paper suggests that the relevant regulatory agencies should further improve the legal system related to institutional investors and standardize the investment behavior of institutional investors so as to promote institutional investors to make use of their professional advantages and gradually play an active role in corporate governance.This study examines the corporate governance of institutional investors and enriches the existing research literature on the corporate governance of institutional investors.At the same time,the policy suggestions of this article are of certain practical significance to further improve our country's institutional environment and promote the positive role of institutional investors.