| Under the background of mass entrepreneurship and innovation,innovative enterprises in China rise rapidly,and are gradually playing an important role in the economic development of China.Meantime,governance of innovative enterprises is facing lots of challenges.How to associate relations between founder and institutional investor is a key issue in enterprise governance structure.On one hand,in the progress of innovative enterprises' development,start-up teams accumulate large amounts of management experiences,reputation,social capital and other related resources.Therefore,it's beneficial to enterprises' healthy development if start-up teams acquire right of control.On the other hand,institutional investors are always major shareholders who are reluctant to abandon right of control on enterprises.Therefore,research on this issue not only contributes to understanding the governance effect of equity structure in innovative enterprises,but also has enlightening significance in policy-making about innovative enterprises.This article analyses shareholder's features,equity structure and governance effect of equity structure firstly.Then the article takes an innovative enterprise Jing Dong as a typical example which carries out dual-class share structure,and by analyzing motivation,practice,influence and governance effect comes to a conclusion that dual-class share structure to some extent can solve the conflict between founder and shareholder on right of control,coordinate interest between them and then improve enterprise governance structure.This article will deepen the understanding on dual-class share structure from the perspective of shareholder and provide practical enlightenment for dilemma of financing and holding control right in innovative enterprise. |
