| With the deepening of Chinese economic system reform and the rapid growth and development of enterprise group,the internal capital market as the most unique feature of the enterprise group,which has got more advantages compared with the the immature and imperfect external capital market in reducing internal transaction costs,reducing internal information asymmetry,providing financing support to internal enterprises,and allocating capital,and so on..However,in the modern enterprise system which is separated from the ownership and management right,the majority of listed companies in China have emerged a dominant status of major shareholders,which provides convenience for the large shareholders to manipulate the internal capital market of the group,this not only distorts the internal capital market to a certain extent,but also leads to a lot of inefficient investment behavior,which also has an impact on the value of the enterprise.As one of the three major financial activities,investment activities are the main motivation for enterprises to obtain the future growth of cash flow and realize the growth of enterprises,and it plays an increasingly prominent intermediary role in the daily operation of enterprises.By evaluating the efficiency of investment decision-making,we can understand the cash flow and value creation of enterprises.In the fierce competitive environment,the efficient operation and management of the internal capital market formed by the enterprise group can provide a lot of convenient services for its investment activities.Owing to the enterprise value is also very important for the owner and operator of the enterprise.Therefore,it has theoretical and practical significance to combine the capital market,investment activities and enterprise value of enterprise group.By collecting and sorting out the related articles of internal capital market,investment efficiency and enterprise value,this paper finds out that the existing scholars study the problem mainly based on the enterprise group major shareholder or controlling shareholder and listed company investment scale,internal capital market and corporate value,non-investment efficiency and corporate value from three perspectives to conduct research.The conclusion is that the "tunneling" behavior of large shareholders or controlling shareholders of enterprise groups can alleviate the overinvestment and aggravate the underinvestment.At the same time,"support" behavior can also alleviate underinvestment,and aggravate excessive investment.The internal capital market can both enhance the value of the enterprise and weaken the value of the enterprise.Non-efficiency Investment most has a negative effect on Enterprise value and the results of the study did not reach the same conclusion.Based on the existing form and active degree of the capital market in the enterprise group,the research on the combination of investment efficiency and enterprise value is scarce.Therefore,based on the problems found in literature review,this paper further determines the breakthrough point,a microscopic perspective of the internal capital market formed by enterprise group:the degree of internal capital market activity.Furthermore,the degree of internal capital market activity is further refined.From the frequency of related transactions between the listed company of the affiliated enterprise group and its parent company,that is,the degree of activity of the internal capital market of the parent-subsidiary company,the study of the inefficient investment in investment activities is started.,at the same time,combining with the study of enterprise value.The problem to be studied and solved in this paper are:(1)Is there a U-shaped or inverted U-shaped relationship between the degree of internal capital market activity of parent-subsidiary companies and the value of enterprises?(2)Is there a U-shaped or inverted U-shaped,or is there linear correlation,positive correlation and negative correlation relationship between the degree of internal capital market activity of parent-subsidiary companies and the inefficiency investment of enterprises?(3)Whether there is intermediary effect,complete intermediary effect or partial intermediary effect between the degree of internal capital market activity and the value of the firm in the internal capital market of parent-subsidiary company.Based on the above problems,this paper takes information asymmetry theory,principal-agent theory,financing priority theory,control theory and other traditional financial theory as the basis of analysis.Firstly,on the basis of the estimation model of the normal capital investment level of enterprises,which is constructed by Richardson's(2006)and other scholars,the absolute value of the residual of this model is regarded as the measure index of the inefficient investment.Secondly,the paper constructs a panel data model with the inefficient investment and the enterprise value as the explanatory variables and internal capital market activity as an explanatory variable.Finally,selecting the Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies of the affiliated enterprise group as the study objects to study the influence of the activity of related transactions between listed companies and their parent companies on their own inefficientinvestment and enterprise value.A total of 3019 observations were obtained through screening and sorting.In this paper,the empirical and normative analysis method is used to test the relationship among the degree of internal capital market activity,the inefficient investment and enterprise value,and the conclusions are as followed:(1)The degree of internal capital market activity of parent-subsidiary company is nonlinear and approximate inverted U-shaped relationship with enterprise value.(2)The degree of internal capital market activity of parent-subsidiary company is positively correlated with inefficient investment.(3)Using Wenzhonglin's three-step method to test the intermediary effect,we obtain the partial intermediary effect of inefficiency investment between the degree of internal capital market of parent-subsidiary company and the enterprise value. |
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