Study On The Relationship Between Related Performance,Corporate Governance And Executive Compensation Of Listed Companies In China

Since the outbreak of the global economic crisis in 2008,the remuneration of top management of the company has attracted the attention of domestic and foreign scholars,business managers and government supervisors.In particular,the reform of the compensation system adopted in 2014 was the focus of public attention on the executive compensation of listed companies in China.At the same time,the domestic media has paid more attention to the executive compensation of listed companies,and more and more reports on�high price�pay have also reached the headlines of relevant social networks such as newspapers and the Internet.In response to the problem of�high price�pay,the government issued a�limitation of pay�to senior management.The absolute performance often used to evaluate executive compensation is easy to operate,but it ignores exogenous risks.In order to increase the correlation between remuneration and performance,China gradually introduced relative performance in the remuneration contract as an important condition to evaluate the level of effort of top management.In theory,there should be a positive correlation between the top management's remuneration and the company's performance,and the two should be consistent.However,in practice,the executive compensation of listed companies and the performance of the company are not consistent,and there are stickiness features.In addition,the establishment of a reasonable corporate governance mechanism is an important condition for ensuring the healthy growth and development of the company.Different levels of corporate governance will also affect the relative performance of executive compensation.Taking into account the fact that the real estate industry and the manufacturing industry have a�high price and salary�phenomenon,so this article takes the listed companies in the real estate industry and manufacturing industry as the research object,and examines the relative performance of listed companies on executive compensation and their relative performance and high.The influence of corporate governance on the asymmetric relationship between the relative performance of listed companies and executive compensation,to help companies formulate a more comprehensive compensation system and improve the Internal governance has important practical significance.Based on the theoretical basis of principal-agent theory and incentive theory,this paper uses the data of listed companies from 681 real estate industries and manufacturing industries in 2008-2011,and builds relevant empirical models to examine the asymmetry between relative performance and executive compensation.Relationships,and research on the impact of corporate governance comprehensive indicators on the relationship between relative performance and executive compensation asymmetry,reached the following conclusions:(1)Among the listed companies in China's real estate industry and manufacturing industry,executive compensation and The relative performance of the company is positively correlated.(2)Among the listed companies in China's real estate industry and manufacturing industry,there is a correlation between executive compensation and company size,where the company is located,and the ultimate controller of the company.(3)Among the listed companies in China's real estate industry and manufacturing industry,there is a stickiness between relative performance and executive compensation.(4)In China's real estate industry and manufacturing industry listed companies,strengthening corporate governance can effectively weaken the stickiness between relative performance and executive compensation.From the list of executive compensation of listed companies published in 2008-2011,this article excludes the financial industry,and the top ten executive compensation is mainly distributed in the real estate industry and manufacturing industry.Taking into account the selection of listed companies in the real estate industry and manufacturing industry will be more representative.Therefore,taking the real estate industry and manufacturing industry as research objects,the relationship between the relative performance of listed companies on executive compensation and the asymmetry between relative performance and executive compensation is examined,and the relative performance of corporate governance on listed companies.The impact of the asymmetry relationship between executive compensation and executive compensation is the expansion and enrichment of existing literature.This study provides theoretical support for the executive compensation system of listed companies in the real estate industry and manufacturing industry,and weakens the relative performance of The asymmetric relationship between executive pay offers insights.Based on the problems between the relative performance of listed companies in the real estate industry and the manufacturing industry,the problems existing in executive compensation,and the empirical regression results of this article,this paper bases on the formulation of executive compensation in the real estate industry and manufacturing industry,weakening relative performance and executive compensation.The stickiness characteristics between the two sides put forward corresponding countermeasures and suggestions,which will help the listed companies in the real estate industry and manufacturing industry to establish a more complete compensation system and improve the company's internal governance.