CEO Tenure,Corporate Governance And Investment Occupation Of The Manufacturing Industry

Manufacturing is the foundation of China's economic transformation,promote the competitiveness of the manufacturing industry should not only rely on the innovation input,more important is to optimize the investment structure under limited resources constraints,conforms to the enterprise own development investment decisions.However,in recent years,the investment crowding in manufacturing enterprises has become more frequent,and the growth situation is still unstable.The CEO is at the core of the corporate power system,and his tenure is a key factor influencing his management model and strategic decision-making ability.Based on the logic of the CEO pursuing the maximization of self-interest under certain constraints,the long-term CEO has a deeper understanding of the business situation.At this time,the CEO is likely to make behavioral decisions for his own interests,and even use the position power to influence the direction of the company's investment activities,triggering investment crowding.Good corporate governance mechanisms to reduce principal-agent cost,supervision and CEO agent process,ease the CEO for personal preference of irrational investment behavior,to be able to play in the process of enterprise investment significantly lower the degree of crowding effect,prompting portfolio optimization more conform to the enterprise development.In this context,it is of great practical significance to explore the internal mechanism of CEO tenure,corporate governance and investment squeeze.This paper selects a sample of manufacturing companies listed in Shanghai and shenzhen from 2007 to 2015 to discuss the relationship between CEO tenure,corporate governance and investment squeeze.Based on the relevant theoretical basis,the research paradigm of CEO tenure,corporate governance and investment squeeze is determined,and the research hypothesis is put forward to construct empirical regression model.Then,using Stata13.0 and SPSS19.0,the data was empirically tested and a series of conclusions were obtained.The study found that the CEO of manufacturing enterprises in China have longer tenure,the more the total investment,the shorter the CEO's expected tenure,the more the total investment will be.In terms of existing tenure,the CEO has a positive correlation with the tenure investment,and with the extension of the existing term,the non-state-owned enterprises are more serious than the state-owned enterprises.In terms of the expected tenure,the expected tenure of the CEO is negatively correlated with the investment squeeze,and the second type of investment in non-state-owned enterprises is mainly occupied,and the crowding out is more serious than the state-owned enterprises.From the perspective of both existing and expected terms,corporate governance can effectively mitigate the investment crowding caused by the personal preference of CEO under the influence of tenure.But compared with state-owned enterprises,the regulation of non-state-owned enterprises is stronger.On the research conclusion in the end,this article puts forward the corresponding countermeasures and Suggestions:First,regulate the term of office of CEOs of listed companies,improve their investment decision-making capabilities.Second,optimize all aspects of capital investment,set up institutionalized decision-making procedures,balance multi-stakeholders,and form a scientific and rational investment decision path.Third,improve corporate governance,strengthen the governance of the board of directors and the board of supervisors,increase the degree of equity checks,increase the proportion of managers holding shares,and gradually weaken the investment crowding caused by CEO agency behavior.