Study On The Influence Of Scholar-type Financial Independent Director On The Accounting Information Disclosure Quality

The specialization of the continuous dispersion and management of equity has intensified and the two types of principal-agent issues have become more and more serious.In order to improve the effectiveness of corporate governance,countries have begun to introduce independent directors in the board of directors.The China Securities Regulatory Commission officially promulgated guidelines for guidance in 2001.All listed companies(including domestic and overseas listed companies)should establish an independent director system.At that time,a large number of domestic studies on the effectiveness of independent directors emerged.The introduction of independent directors has improved the board of directors mechanism and the corporate legal person mechanism.It can form a constraint on large shareholders to a certain extent so that the legitimate rights and interests of small and medium shareholders can be protected.In addition,independent directors can also rely on their own professional knowledge to form supervision over management The governance function of the independent director system is independent of the independence of independent directors and their professional competency.However,the equity of domestic listed companies is relatively concentrated.Often,the controlling shareholder is monopolized.The right to use independent directors is mainly controlled by the controlling shareholder and senior management.Under such circumstances,it is difficult for independent directors to maintain "independence".Collusion with senior managers or controlling shareholders makes it difficult for independent directors to play an effective supervisory and governance role.A large number of empirical studies in China have shown that independent directors do not play an effective governance role in the board of directors.Under such circumstances,it is important to choose an independent director with strong independence and professional competence.This paper adopts normative research and empirical analysis,combining the existing background of the independent director system in China,using the data from 2012 to 2016 of listed companies on the Shenzhen Main Board as the initial sample to study the proportion of independent directors and scholar-directed financial directors.The impact of the quality of information disclosure.First of all,we collected relevant research documents from independent directors at home and abroad,focused on the study of the proportion of independent directors and the influence of financial independent directors on the quality of accounting information disclosure,and explained the mechanism of the role of scholar-type financial independent directors from the perspective of "prestige".Secondly,according to the existing research experience,the relevance of accounting information is used to measure the quality of accounting information disclosure.The value relevance of accounting information is represented by the surplus response coefficient,and the measurement standard of each research variable is determined.Finally,according to the purpose of this study,construct a research model and use STATA 10 and other statistical software for regression analysis.The research results show that:(1)There is no significant correlation between the proportion of independent directors and the quality of accounting information disclosure.(2)Scholar-type financial independent directors have a positive influence on the quality of accounting information disclosure.Scholar-type financial independent directors have higher independence in the board of directors,and have the necessary professional competence to play a role in corporate governance.(3)Other conditions remain the same.The quality of corporate accounting information disclosed by some scholars as financial independent directors will be better,and the effectiveness of this kind of governance of scholar-type financial independent directors is more pronounced in non-state-owned enterprises than in state-owned enterprises.(4)Other conditions remain the same.Accounting information disclosed by accounting scholars who serve as independent financial directors has better disclosure of accounting information,and this effect is even more pronounced in the employment of low-quality accounting firms.