Research On Motivation And Effect Of Non-executive Stock Equity Incentives

The separation of modern enterprise ownership and management rights has brought about an important issue in corporate governance-agency costs.In order to coordinate the conflicts between shareholders and managers,stock option incentives,have played an important role in solving the issue of agency costs.Stock option incentives are generally divided into executive option incentives and non-executive option incentives.In the early days,due to more use,scholars paid more attention to executive equity incentives.However,over time,we have found that non-executive equity incentives play an increasingly important role in both academic research and practical life.This article takes a listed company(the financial data used from 2007 to 2016)that released the equity incentive plan from 2008 to 2015 as a sample to study the motivation and incentive effect of non-executive stock incentives.There are three explanation theories of implementation motivation.They are motivating employees,retaining employees,and cash constraints.The regression results of the whole sample,private enterprises and non-high-tech companies show that the incentives to attract employees and retain employees are strong,and the explanatory power of cash constraints is weak.For the sample of high-tech enterprises,all three theories have a certain degree of explanatory power;for state-owned enterprises,the three theories cannot explain the motives for the implementation of non-executive equity incentives.Regarding incentive effects,the regression results of the full sample show that,in the medium and long term,non-executive equity incentives will reduce the total factor productivity of enterprises,and the increase in the number of enterprises will increase the decline.The total assets and ROA have a positive effect on the growth of the TFP index.These impacts are even more pronounced in private companies,high-tech companies,and companies that do not have cash flow shortages.