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Analysis Of Shareholder Behavior And Its Restriction Mechanism In Control Right Competition Of Listed Company In China

Posted on:2019-10-14Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:H Y LiuFull Text:PDF
GTID:2429330548463547Subject:Accounting
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
Corporate governance relates to the company's operations and growth,and equity structure is an important aspect of corporate governance.In recent years,disputes over control have often occurred.More cases of contention for control involve competition for both parties.Eventually one of the parties wins.This case is a typical case in which the three parties participate,the two parties compete,and the third party wins.They respectively study the behaviors of shareholders,the causes,and the results of the struggle for control rights and influence.In addition,this paper proposes a restraining mechanism from the shareholders' level to the behaviors that damage the company's value and the interests of small and medium shareholders during the competition between the two major shareholders,and proposes a common governance mechanism for stakeholders from the perspective of the company as a whole.The ownership structure of listed companies in China is relatively concentrated,and the majority of shareholders have control right.In the decision-making of corporate affairs,small and medium-sized shareholders are at a disadvantage.Decision-making power is what they are lack of.Under the asymmetric information,the conflicts of interest make the research of principal-agent problem more abundant and deep.Based on the above background,this paper uses the single case study method,selecting the case of new and former first major shareholder control rights conflict of Shanghai Xinmei from year 2013 to 2016.Through the analysis of the whole process of two major shareholders' equity conflict,deeply analyze the incentives for control rights competition,behavior of all parties,actual impact on the value of the company as well as the restraint mechanisms of all parties' behavior.First of all,clarify the whole process of the case company control rights,in order to analyze the behavior of the parties.Secondly,combined with the theory,the paper defines the control right income and the company value promotion commitment in the case and analyzes the behavior of the parties to the control right competition respectively.Based on historical stock price and financial data,through event research method and comparative analysis method,this paper analyzes the influence on company value from two aspects of market reaction and company performance.Finally,through the analysis of behavior of the parties,the paper puts forward the restraint mechanism corresponding,in order to enhance the value of the company.Based on my case study,I put forward four feasible suggestions.Through the research,this paper finds that the private income of control rights is the driving force of the control rights competition between the original and the new major shareholders.The two major shareholders compete for control rights through shareholders' general meeting and lawsuit,which has a negative impact on the company value and damages the interests of small and medium shareholders.The third largest shareholder,did not actually participate in the fight,but obtained the final control.The competition was successfully resolved and the value of the company was enhanced.Therefore,from the perspective of enhancing the value of the company,combined with the behavior of competing for the interests of all parties and the protection of the interests of small and medium shareholders,the paper put forward targeted restraint mechanisms,including checks and balances mechanism of major shareholders,equity acquisition behavior specification mechanism,protection mechanism of the interests of small and medium shareholders and stakeholder co-governance mechanism.Through this study,on one hand,I hope that shareholders pay more attention to company's management and corporate governance and have a clear judgment of company's development orientation;On the other hand,I hope that managers of company pay more attention to the protection of the interests of investors.Small and medium shareholders should also actively safeguard their own interests.In addition,I hope to attract the attention of other companies and relevant departments for control right competition,maintain market economic order and improve the relevant laws and regulations.
Keywords/Search Tags:control right competition, private benefits of control, company value, restriction mechanism
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