Ownership Structure?Governance Structure Of Listed Companies In China And Financial Fraud

Since the 1990 s,there have been financial fraud related cases in stock markets around the world.By the beginning of this century,the phenomenon of financial fraud showed explosive growth.Financial chaos such as financial fraud and financial fraud frequently occurs,which has caused research scholars to pay attention to this field.In recent years,with the continuous development of China's stock market and the continuous increase in the number of listed companies,China's financial fraud has become more and more serious,which has caused adverse effects on C hina's stock market and even financial markets.For example,after C hina's Yunnan Greenland Biological Company forged various financial documents and was discovered and announced by the Securities Regulatory Commission,the stock price plummeted,which seriously affected the stability of China's stock ma rket.This article through the study of the concepts related to financial fraud,mainly analyzes three famous theories in financial fraud theory: fraud triangle theory,GONE theory and fraud risk factor theory.In addition,in order to analyze the specific influence of related variables,this paper summarizes the theoretical research of each variable based on principal-agent theory,information asymmetry theory and stakeholder theory.Based on the relevant theories of financial fraud,this article begins with the companies that have been notified of violations by the China Securities Regulatory Commission,and conducts empirical analysis on the equity structure and governance structure.This article uses 934 listed companies with irregularities between 2006 and 2016 as samples to conduct overall sample regression analysis.According to certain indicators,the samples are divided into state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned enterprises for comparative analysis to observe the overall sample and comparison.The results of the analysis further prove the validity of the results.This article draws the following conclusions: State-owned holdings and higher concentration of ownership are conducive to strengthening company management,effectively utilizing shareho lder rights,and reducing the occurrence of financial fraud;the board of supervisors plays an important regulatory role in corporate governance and can Through the board of supervisors holding shares to strengthen this effect.Excessive board size will diversify shareholder rights and allow managers to take advantage of them;and when directors and CEOs hold concurrent posts,they will increase opportunities for financial fraud.Through the study of relevant variables,this paper has enriched the analysis of relevant factors of financial fraud,and provided certain data support for the study of China's unique corporate ownership,and provided certain recommendations for the management of listed companies themselves,and also for regulatory agencies.The regulation of financial fraud indicates the direction.