Property Right,Analysts' Earnings Forecasts And Earnings Management

In the capital market,the asymmetric information caused by principal-agent relationship makes agent managers have the opportunity to use their rights and information superiority to intervene the financial report of listed companies by means of earnings management,so that realize their own benefit maximization.With the rapid rise of China's capital market,the securities analyst industry has sprung up rapidly,which plays an important role in China's capital market.On the one hand,Securities analysts have the function of information intermediary,they can interpret and analyze information disclosed by listed companies by their professional skills,and then deliver information to investors by issuing earnings forecast reports or oral ways.On the other hand,the Securities analyst transfer the information of listed companies through the way of earnings forecast,narrowing the information gap between investors and management,can indirectly restrain the opportunism behavior of the company management,and plays an external supervision role in the capital market;Therefore,It is worth discussing whether the earnings forecast issued by securities analysts has an effect on earnings management of listed companies.However,the existing literature focuses on the impact of accrual earnings management and ignores the impact of analyst on real earnings management.Based on this,this paper introduces information asymmetry theory,property right theory and efficient market hypothesis theory,deeply analyzes the influence of Securities analyst earnings forecast on the accrual management of listed companies and the real earnings management,and on this basis,further studies the influence of Securities analyst earnings forecast on earnings management under different property rights.The purpose is to standardize our Securities analyst external governance functions and improve the internal governance mechanism of listed companies put forward scientific and reasonable suggestions.This paper takes the 2012-2016 data of China's a-share motherboard as research sample,using the calculation method of abnormal manipulation project to measure the level of accrual earnings management and real earnings management of listed companies,and researching the impact of analysts' earnings forecasts on earnings management and real earnings management,Research results show that :(1)The earnings forecastdeviation of securities analyst has the promotion effect on earnings management,which means the larger the deviation of analysts' earnings forecasts,the higher the earnings management of listed companies.Compared with non-state-owned enterprises,the earnings forecast deviation of securities analyst is more significant for the promotion of earnings management in state-owned enterprises.(2)The Securities analyst's attention has the function of restraining Accrual earnings management and promoting the Real earnings management,that means the substitution effect between accrual earnings management and real earnings management,and its promotion to real earnings management is more remarkable than that of Non-state-owned enterprises.(3)Under different property rights,compared with state-owned enterprises,The Securities analyst's attention is more obvious to the non-state-owned enterprises' Accrual earnings management.Finally,based on the above conclusions,this paper puts forward some suggestions on perfecting the external governance functions of securities analysts and strengthening the internal management mechanism of enterprises.It can provides theoretical support and empirical data for standardizing the securities analyst market and perfecting the internal governance of listed companies.