Promoting Incentives And Economic Growth

Since the reform and opening up,China's economic growth rate has been rapid.The gross domestic product(GDP)is already second only to the United States in the world,and the average annual real GDP growth rate is maintained at a relatively high level.The estimated future domestic production value can achieve a higher breakthrough.In this process,the Chinese government has played an indispensable role.From the perspective of the government organization structure,the Chinese government and the western government are essentially different.The implemented socialism is different from other economic efficiency mechanisms.From the angle of system,it explores the reasons that affect the economic growth of China's prefecture-level cities,and analyzes the "politics-economy" of China's economic growth under the promotion system of promotion.Fiscal decentralization reform is a factor that promotes economic growth in prefecture-level cities in China.The source of local officials' promotion incentives is mainly the pursuit of political control rights.The benefits of political control are mainly reflected in two aspects : promotion of positions(vertical promotion incentives)and financial incentives brought about by fiscal decentralization(horizontal "Self-promotion" incentive).Considering the mixed incentives of the two together constitute the driving force for local officials to promote economic growth in their jurisdictions,the sum of these incentives does constitute an incentive for their actions.At present,there are numerous documents that select provincial-level data for empirical research,and Chinese prefectural-level officials are more likely to be reflected in the current system than provincial and ministerial-level officials.The effect of incentive promotion system appraisal on China 's economic growth.The empirical model for this article refers to Mankiw et al.(1992)proposed the method of setting the economic growth model,selected 18 cities in 283 prefecture-level cities in 26 provinces in China for 18 years,and 1263 city mayoral secretaries and 1446 mayoral personal characteristics data.Using empirical regression results to analyze the impact of the core explanatory variables(whether the prefecture-level officials were promoted in the current year)on the economic growth in their jurisdictions,and analyze the heterogeneity of officials.Through sub-sample regression,we investigated the differences in the behavior of officials in prefecture-level cities in the east,middle and west areas facing promotion incentives.According to the empirical results of this paper,the conclusions,policy suggestions and research prospects are given.Using the panel data of 283 prefecture-level cities from 1998 to 2015,the following conclusions are drawn:Firstly,under the current cadre management system,Chinese prefectural-level city officials will respond positively to promotion incentives.In the area of economic growth within the jurisdiction;secondly,prefecture-level city officials face incentives for promotion,can respond to economic growth within the jurisdiction,these are prerequisites,depending on the age and term of office of officials.The influence of the number of years of office of prefecture-level city officials on the economic growth of the area has inverted U-shaped features;Finally,when officials from prefecture-level cities face the same incentives for promotion,the impact of promotion incentives on economic growth has obvious regional differences,and the effect produced in the east is greater than that in the central and western regions.