Third-degree Price Discrimination、Search Cost And Resale Price Maintenance

The anti-monopoly case of resale price maintenance tends to replace the “principle of illegality” with “reasonable principle” in the long-term theoretical guidance and practice test.The academic community is also more inclined to justify the resale price maintenance.However,whether the interpretation of the rationality of the price limit or the interpretation of its illegality is only analyzed under the framework of single price pricing,it ignores the situation of price discrimination due to consumer-level heterogeneity,As a result,the study on the maintenance of resale prices has not yet formed a system under the discriminatory price framework.Even if some scholars(Yongmin Chen(1999))really noticed the link between price restriction and price discrimination,because they are designed to study the motivation to implement RPM,the model is simplified,and the cost factors at the consumer level are not considered.This article expands on the basis of its research,thus introducing the variable cost of transportation,and aims to analyze the following issues:the first is whether manufacturers still have the motivation to implement resale price maintenance under the framework of price discrimination;the second is the specific motives for their implementation;the third is what an impact on the effect of resale price maintenance implementation the important variable of consumer search cost will have Under the motivation of the resale price maintenance implementation.Under the guidance of these issues,this article has conducted a shallow analysis.First,a simple model was established to initially introduce the hypothesis of consumer search heterogeneity.Under the assumption that consumers have a uniform and identical distribution of utility,and that there are only two oligopolistic retailers,The Haotailin model was used to analyze the equilibrium of the retail market before the RPM implementation and the equilibrium of the manufacturer when the joint profit was maximized.The first two questions were answered successively.Second,since the basic model only provides the basic theoretical ideas and research framework for subsequent analysis,it is necessary to do an inductive analysis after generalizing its important assumptions.Based on the simple model,assuming that the utility distribution of consumers is inconsistent and their respective distribution functions are general and the retailer extends to n,the Circle model are used to answer the three questions in sequence.After synthesizing the analysis of this article,the following three questions were made:First,after the introduction of the traffic cost factor,the manufacturer still has the incentive to implement resale price maintenance under the condition that the consumer utility distribution function satisfies the monotonic risk rate of formula(33).However,the implementation scope of the resale price maintenance changes due to the introduction of transportation costs.The second is that when there is a need for RPM implementation,the motive for its implementation is to eliminate the three-level price discrimination caused by cross-demand elasticity effect,while maintaining the three-level price discrimination based on the inconsistent utility of consumer retention,at this time,the price ceiling and The lower price limit is feasible;Third,the introduction of transportation costs has a renewed impact on the retail market equilibrium price before and after the implementation of resale price maintenance,as well as the profits of manufacturers and social welfare,and The degree of influence on the resale price maintenance implementation effect needs to be determined by linking the nature of the two types of consumer utility distribution functions and the proportions of the two types of consumers.The policy implications of the conclusions are: Although price discrimination is beneficial to social welfare in terms of economic efficiency,while The use of resale price maintenance by manufacturers to prevent spontaneous price discrimination in the retail market appears to be anti-competitive.But it also needs to be determined according to the goal of anti-monopoly law enforcement.Since anti-monopoly law enforcement targets are generally based on consumer welfare,social welfare orientation is consistent with consumer welfare orientation.This analysis shows that the social benefits of manufacturers after implementing resale price maintenance are not absolutely reduced.They also need to be determined based on the distribution ratios of the two types of consumers and the nature of consumer utility distribution functions.Therefore,In the case of the implementation of resale price maintenance under the framework of price discrimination,whether it is legal or not requires specific analysis.