Study On The Management Effect Of Dividend Distribution On Corporate Excessive Investment Under The Cash Dividend Supervision Policy

In order to guide and regulate the cash dividends of listed companies,China Securities Regulatory Commission promulgated a series of policy step by step to constraint the listed company cash dividend behavior in 2004,2006,2008,2013.According to its specific regulatory measures,these regulatory policy can be divided into two phases: half compulsory cash dividend regulatory policy implementation stage(enforcing the half compulsory regulatory measures by linking up refinancing qualification of listed companies with cash dividend behavior)and differentiation of cash dividend regulation policy implementation stage(enforcing the comprehensive regulatory measures of directly stipulating the minimal cash dividend ratio of different types of listed companies).Cash dividend regulation policy as one of the means of administrative intervention will absolutely affect the cash dividends decision of listed companies and this effect varies according to the regulatory policy.Dividend agency theory thinks that cash dividend distribution has governance effects of excessive investment,thus to explore the dividend distribution's management role of excessive investment under different cash dividends regulatory policy is of important theoretical and practical significance.This paper studies the governance effect of dividend distribution on listed companies' excessive investment under the two cash dividends supervision policy and explores the regulatory policies that are beneficial to the cash dividend' governance effect on excessive investment.Through theoretical analysis and empirical test,this paper respectively studied step by step for the following questions:(1)the cash dividend distribution under different cash dividends regulatory policy' governance effect of listed company' excessive investment;(2)refinancing needs' effect on dividend distribution' governance effect on listed companies' excessive investment under two types of cash dividends supervision policies.Study found that:(1)listed companies' cash dividends level under two kinds of regulatory policy is negatively correlated with excessive investment,but the influence listed company's cash dividends' continuity under two kinds of policy makes on excessive investment behavior is different,cash dividends' continuity of listed companies under the semi-compulsory supervision policy is positively correlated to excessive investment behavior.Under the semi-compulsory supervision policy,the more cash dividends the listed companies have,the more serious the over-investment behavior will be.(2)for listed companies with refinancingrequirements,the governance effect of dividend distribution on excessive investment is more effective under the differentiated cash dividends supervision policy;For listed companies with no refinancing needs,the governance effect of dividend distribution on excessive investment is effective under both regulatory policies.The research and conclusion of this paper show that the differentiated cash dividend regulation policy is more conducive to the effect of cash dividend on excessive investment management.Differentiated cash dividend regulation policy' comprehensive supervision measures of directly stipulating the minimal cash dividend ratio of various companies are more effective in restraining the excessive investment behavior of listed companies.Research and its conclusions of this paper explores whether the government regulators' intervention for the listed company' cash dividend decision can promote the role of excessive investment management or not,is helpful to deepen the study of dividend agency cost theory;At the same time,relevant conclusions play a beneficial effect on securities market regulators improving the effectiveness of regulatory policies,better guiding the company to improve the cash dividend mechanism and protecting investors' interests.