External Compensation Gap,Information Disclosure Quality And Inefficient Investment

With the implementation of the reform plan for management pay of the central management company in 2015,a new round of compensation reform for state-owned enterprises has been unveiled.But at the same time,there is still a rise in executive pay for listed state-owned enterprises.The phenomenon of the increase in salaries is still there.Due to the generally low efficiency of investment behavior of listed companies in our country,and the actual situation of company executives acting as the main resource allocation decision makers,pay contract,which acts as the most important mechanism to solve the agency problem between shareholders and executives,hardly form an effective investment decision of executive incentive and constraint.This phenomenon inspires us to study whether the management compensation gap has a negative effect on the efficiency of investment.Information disclosure is a bridge of communication between executives and shareholders.High-quality information disclosure can reduce information asymmetry,strengthen the binding of capital market for executives,which also makes us wonder whether enlarging management pay gap would improve the quality of information disclosure,so as to explore the role of information disclosure quality between the pay gap and the investment efficiency,thus to further the path of the salary gap effect on the efficiency of investment.This article attempts from the empirical perspective to research on the relationship between management external compensation gap,information disclosure quality and the efficiency of investment.The quality of information disclosure is expected to be the mediator between the wage gap and investment efficiency.Based on the tests in sequence such as Sobel testing and bootstraping,using the sample of Shenzhen stock exchange a-share company from 2012 to 2016,we have the following conclusions.Results show that the state-owned listed companies management external pay gap has a significant negative relationship between disclosure quality and the quality of information disclosure negatively correlates with the investment inefficiency,while external compensation gap with the non-state-owned listed companies management present obvious positive correlation between the efficiency of investment.So quality of information disclosure plays the part of the intermediary role.And although the quality of information disclosure in state-owned listed companies still inhibit the action of the inefficient investment,its relationship between management external pay gap and the quality of information disclosure is not significant,the research conclusion of the non-state-owned enterprise does not apply to state-owned listed companies.This paper demonstrates the robustness of these conclusions by replacing the measurement methods of executive compensation and non-efficiency investments.The conclusion is that the non-fairness of executive compensation in non-state-owned enterprises can lead to management envy,which is detrimental to the quality of information disclosure and the improvement of investment efficiency.Finally,we put forward some suggestions,including improving the system and mechanism,optimizing the governance environment,revising the rules of information disclosure,improving the quality of disclosure,classifying macro regulation and control,and curbing the wage comparison.