An Empirical Study On Management Power And Information Disclosure Quality From The Perspective Of Industry Competition

The disclosure quality of the public corporation is not only the core content of the disclosure system of the stock market,but also one of the main questions of the modern firm's financial theory.Information disclosure is an important way to convey the company's development information to external investors and relevant information users.High-quality information disclosure can not only improve the company's value,but also an important guarantee for investors' profit,and it will help to improve the resource allocation efficiency and maintain the healthy development of capital market.Therefore,it is important and profound to improve the quality of information disclosure.However,there are still a lot of cases in China's securities market due to the violation of laws and regulations.The quality of company information disclosure is imminent.As the main information discloser of the company,the size of management power will fundamentally affect the quality of information disclosure.Industry competition is the external environment for each enterprise to survive and develop,different levels of competitiveness,the sensitivity of management power to the quality of information disclosure.Introducing competition factors,distinguish the relationship between management power and information disclosure quality under different degree of competition,and it's more helpful to improve the quality of information disclosure by making policy,according to the different degree of industry competition.This paper defines the main concepts such as industry competition,management power and information disclosure quality,and applies the stakeholder theory,principal-agent theory,information asymmetry theory and management power theory,and appling literature review,normative analysis and empirical analysis method to study the relationship between management's positive power(Duality,Whether management holdings)and negative power(Rotfam,the shareholding ratio of the largest shareholder)and the quality of information disclosure.Meanwhile,the relationship between management authority and the quality of information disclosure is further studied according to Distinguish high and low different market structures.Research shows that,in terms of the relationship of management power with information disclosure quality,it is concluded that the Duality is negatively related to the quality of information disclosure,and Whether management holdings,Rotfam,the shareholding ratio of the largest shareholder and information disclosure quality is positively related;Introduced into the industry competition to research the relationship of both,and it is concluded that a higher degree of industry competition can weaken the negative relationship of Duality and the quality of information disclosure,strengthen the positive relationship of Whether management holdings,Rotfam,the shareholding ratio of the largest shareholder and the quality of information disclosure.Based on the empirical results of the article,it is proposed to strengthen and consummate the disclosure system of the public corporation,to improve the internal governance mechanism,to control and configure reasonably the management power and to introduce the mechanism of market competition,to increase the market vitality to play the role of the industry competition on the administration,to further enhance the transparency of the corporation's transparency,to reduce the manipulation of the management to disclose information,and to promote the healthy development of the capital markets.