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Research On Executive Compensation Incentive Of Monopoly Enterprises Based On Actual Performance Of Enterprises

Posted on:2019-01-08Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:D D HuangFull Text:PDF
GTID:2429330545472512Subject:Labor economics
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
Reasonable and effective compensation incentive system is an important factor for the sustainable development of any enterprise,and also an effective way to alleviate the problem of principal-agent problem.Though since the reform and opening up,China has never been interrupted on the research of the enterprise executive compensation incentive problem,have also made remarkable achievements.However,due to the special monopoly advantages and status of monopoly enterprises,the incentive mechanism of executive compensation in monopolistic enterprises still exists,such as excessive incentives and inadequacies,rent-seeking behaviors of senior executives,and in-service consumption.Therefore,it is obvious that the compensation system of monopolistic executives is still not standardized,and how to establish a sound and effective incentive mechanism for executive compensation is an urgent problem to be solved.The premise to solve the problem of executive compensation incentive is to objectively evaluate the actual performance of the enterprise.It choose banking,telecommunication,broadcast television and satellite transmission service industry,electric power production and supply,coal mining and dressing and that market of the 4 monopolistic and retail industry in the retail industry as the research object.On the basis of summarizing the related literature research,this paper consider the nested structure of original data,using hierarchical linear mixed model with BLUP method to explore the nature of the enterprise actual performance attributes,this model can better eliminating the influence of external environment factors to the enterprise actual performance,more accurately assess the enterprise actual performance.Based on the objective evaluation of enterprise performance,this paper will samples of monopoly industry and competitive industry executives pay related data for empirical research,comparative analysis found that actual performance,enterprise scale,the number of executives shareholding is the main factor affecting the monopoly enterprise executive compensation incentive.Compared with apparent performance and enterprise EVA performance,executive compensation has the highest correlation with enterprise actual performance.According to the empirical results in this paper,the monopoly enterprise executive compensation incentive is optimized: choose enterprise actual performance as the core index,executive compensation incentive optimization model is constructed,and put forward the corresponding measures,in order to pay incentives to maximize play its role.
Keywords/Search Tags:Executive performance, Hierarchical linear mixed model, Compensation incentive, Monopoly of state-owned enterprises
PDF Full Text Request
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