Internai Control Of Equity Incentive In State-owned Enterprises

Since the reform and opening up in 1978,in order to meet the deepening reform requirements of the socialist market economic system,state-owned enterprises have been growing up in reforms.This year,reform and opening up will usher in the 40th year,and the process of state-owned enterprise reform is still advancing.From the initial decentralization to the basic idea of the enterprise,and to the state-owned enterprise equity reform plan proposed in 2015,the reform and development of state-owned enterprises are obvious to all.However,while the state-owned enterprise reform has achieved its achievements,there are also problems in the reform process.How can equity incentives maximize the role in the reform of state-owned enterprises?After research and analysis of pilot companies,how can the reform of equity incentive systems in state-owned enterprises be detoured is an issue that we must study.This article selected the first batch of state-owned equity incentive reform pilot enterprises,Guangming Dairy,as the analysis target,and analyzed the performance of the company before and after implementing the equity incentive system.Taking the insider control as the entry point,he explores the problems in the Guangming Daily's equity incentive system,analyzes the reasons in depth,and gives suggestions for improvement based on this,and finally promotes other companies.The conclusion of this paper is that the ownership incentive system of China's state-owned enterprises does have internal control problems.This is due to the special nature of state-owned enterprises.To reduce the influence of insider control on state-owned enterprises,it is necessary to proceed from various aspects,including corporate governance and policy supervision.Reducing the influence of insider control on the company can make the equity incentive system play a greater role in state-owned enterprises.