Research On The Influence Of Control Rights Allocation Difference On The Motive And Motivation Of Listed Companies' Equity Incentives

Equity incentives are widely used to solve the problem of principal-agent issues.The use of this system by listed companies in China is becoming more formal and standardized.Internally,modern companies have basically formed the governance model of shareholders'meetings,board of directors,and management.They are interconnected and restrict each other.The allocation of control rights between shareholders' meetings,board of directors,and managers has a motive for the design of stock incentives and equity incentives.The effect of the implementation will have different effects.The article first introduced the background of the topic selection,research significance,research methods,research content and innovation,as well as literature review at home and abroad.Afterwards,the concept of equity incentive,related theory and the concept and classification of control rights allocation are expounded in detail,which is the theoretical basis of this paper.In the case study,after the privatization of Shanghai Jahwa as an example,longitudinal comparison of the differences in the control of the existence of the background,the two sets of equity incentive program specific terms of design,motivation incentives and incentive effect differences,hoping to adopt the case This paper explores the impact of differences in the allocation of control rights on the motivation and effectiveness of equity incentive design.The study finds that:Shanghai Jahwa's board structure is independent,internal checks and balances of power occur,and managers are elected by the board of directors.When not controlled by large shareholders,the design of equity incentive terms is more reasonable.In terms of motivation,it is relatively strong incentive.From the results,the company's performance and share price also have a more obvious role in the promotion.On the contrary,when the major shareholders have higher control over the board of directors and the general manager is directly appointed by the major shareholder and the two positions are united,their equity incentives have a strong welfare color and the market response is more general.Based on this,this paper puts forward some suggestions on how to improve the incentive effect of equity incentive.