Executive Equity Incentives,Managerial Financial Background And Enterprise Investment Efficiency

The separation of ownership and control leads to the agency conflict between owners and operators,which reduces the investment efficiency of enterprises.Therefore,how to mitigate agency problems has become the key to improve investment efficiency.The equity incentive theory holds that the executive equity incentive is an effective way to solve the agency conflict.So,is the higher the level of executive equity incentive,the more conducive to the mitigation of agency conflict,the more conducive to improving the efficiency of investment? Does the executive equity incentive have the same effect on investment efficiency in different property rights enterprises? At the same time,equity incentive is closely related with the executive ability and the background,considering the importance of investment financing efficiency,and make further analysis of influence of executives of financial background on the relationship between executive equity incentive and the efficiency of investment,whether the financial background strengthen the relationship between the equity incentive and the efficiency of investment? Whether the impact of executive's financial background on the relationship between executive equity incentive and investment efficiency in enterprises of different property rights is same? The answer to the above questions is to further clarify the important role of executive equity incentive and executive financial background in improving the efficiency of enterprise investment.This paper selects 2012-2016 years of Shanghai and Shenzhen two A shares of listed companies as the research sample,the substitute variables of executive shareholding ratio as the equity incentive,the incentive effect on the efficiency of investment research executive equity executives,considering the background factors.Besides this paper make further study of executive financial background influence on the relationship between executive equity incentive and investment efficiency,and make further research on distinguishing the property demonstration.This paper draws the following four conclusions: first,The relationship between executive incentive and investment efficiency is inverted U,the optimal point of equity incentive is 19.65%;second,compared to the non state-owned enterprises,state-owned enterprise executives equity incentive and investment efficiency of the inverted "U" relationship is more significant;third,the executives have the financial background will significantly enhance the executive equity incentive and the investment efficiency of the inverted "U" relationship;fourth,Among the non-state-owned enterprises,the executive of financial background can significantly strengthen the relationship between the executive incentive and the investment efficiency,but the influence of senior executives in the state-owned enterprises on the relationship between the two is insignificant.The conclusions of this paper provide theoretical support and empirical evidence for how to develop equity incentive programs,how to consider the executives of financial background and improve investment efficiency.