| Top managers are the core and the soul of a company.They have significant influence to the company and their decisions also influence the direction of the company's development.In recent years,the incidents of plastering firm performances in Chinese stock market have exposed the fact that our listed companies are lack of the supervision and control over management personnel and effective incentive and restriction mechanism to regularize top managers' behaviors.The reasons of this problem are related to current enterprise management system.In the modern enterprise system,the separation of ownership and management right has led to the issue of principal-agent problem.The principal-agent problem is based on the circumstance of asymmetric information and high supervision cost.The agents follow their principle of maximizing their own profits and do things that are not conducive to the effective management of the company and have damage to the interests of the shareholders.In order to avoid the problem,the company's board of directors takes the form of replacing top managers to constrain their behaviors and improve firm performance.At the same time,due to the accumulation of their own knowledge,technical capabilities,human resources and other aspects,the top managers compete for the management positions through their struggle for power.They replace the incompetent managers and become the successors.The companies listed on the SME board and the GEM are mostly high-tech enterprises,so they pay more attention to R&D.Therefore,these companies have certain requirement on knowledge and technical capabilities of top managers.Then,when corporate technical capital and human capital increase,will it cause some top managers leave?This paper uses the proportion of corporate intangible assets to represent the company's technical capital and the proportion of wage cost to represent human capital,and examines the relationship between the two and the reasons for the turnover of top managers.Through the empirical analysis of the competitive risk regression model,we find that there is a significant positive correlation between the increase of corporate technical capital and the turnover of top managers due to the reason of "the end of being the agent".The accumulation of corporate technical capital causes the agent managers terminate their agency duties and become successors with their knowledge and skills.And the proportion of corporate wage cost is also significantly positive related to the turnover of top managers due to the reason of "improved corporate governance structure".The increase of corporate human capital prompts companies to improve their incentive and restriction mechanism and motivate those who are more capable and responsible become the successive manager.Whether it is to resolve the issue of principal-agent problem or the replacement through power struggle,it leads to the turnover of the top managers.So can changing top managers improve firm performance?Through combining and summarizing domestic and foreign literature,this paper finds that domestic and foreign scholars have not reached to a consistent conclusion on the research issue of the influence of the turnover of top managers to firm performance.One class of scholars supports the hypothesis of "performance improvement" and believes that the turnover of top managers can significantly improve firm performance.While another class of scholars agrees with the "scapegoat" hypothesis that the turnover of top managers can't improve firm performance.And the managers who are dismissed may not be incapable,but instead,they act as scapegoats.This paper uses the changes of chairman and general manager of listed companies on the SME board and the GEM as research samples and divides them into two parts,which are the turnover of the original top managers and the succession of top managers.And we'll discuss their influence to firm performance.This paper uses the classification method of related literature,and divides the turnover into regular change and irregular change,and the succession into outside and inside.Then this paper dynamically studies the changing ranges of firm performance during the year,two,and three,and the year before the change to discuss the short-term and long-term effects of turnover of top managers.Using the OLS regression model,this paper concludes that there is a significantly negative correlation between top managers' turnover and firm performance,which shows that the turnover of top managers reduce the firm performance.The regular change doesn't have a significant impact on firm performance,and irregular change reduces firm performance.Besides,the outside successor can raise the stock returns in the long term,and the inside successor has negative influence on firm performance. |
