Private Capital Participation And Equity Incentive Effect In State-owned Enterprises

As a good "agent" to solve the problem of principal-agent,equity incentive has been figuratively compared to the "gold handcuffs" of the managers.However,in China,the implementation effect of equity incentive is not optimistic,Most of the equity incentives fail to achieve the due incentive effect because of many problems in the design of the system and the defects of the corporate governance environment.In recent years,based on the theory of property rights and management rights,scholars have begun to reflect on the reasons for the different effects of equity incentives from the perspective of property rights and motivation of equity incentive.As an important breakthrough in the reform of state-owned enterprises,the starting point of the reform of the mixed ownership system is the introduction of non-state capital to form a corporate governance structure conducive to the development of state-owned enterprises.Under the background of the mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises,this paper studies the relationship among property allocation,mutual checks and balances between state-owned and non-state-owned shareholders and the effect of equity incentive.It has certain theoretical and practical significance.In addition,in view of the serious "insider control" problem of state-owned enterprise and its equity incentive is easily controlled by "insider",This paper attempts to explore the equity incentive motivation as a mediating role between private equity participation and equity incentive effect,To a certain extent,it enriches the existing research of property right and equity incentive effect,and provides active policy reference for state-owned enterprises' mixed ownership reform.Firstly,this paper elaborates the research background,purpose and significance.And then,we summarizes and reviews relevant researches on equity incentive effect and motivation,property right nature and equity incentive,and mixed ownership reform at home and abroad.On this basis,this paper puts forward research hypotheses for the relationship among property right nature and equity incentive motivation,private capital participation and motivation and effect of equity incentive in state-owned enterprises.Then,this paper takes the draft of the implementation of the equity incentive plan of the non-financial listed company of A shares in 2010-2016 years as the research sample,through the descriptive analysis,correlation analysis,two element Logistic regression analysis and multiple linear regression analysis to verify the research hypothesis.The results show that the motivation of equity incentive of the state-owned enterprises is more inclined to the welfare type,while the motivation of equity incentive of the non-state-owned enterprises is more inclined to incentive type;Only the participation of non-state capital in the high-level governance dimension can significantly weaken the choice of the welfare type incentive motivation and improve the effect of equity incentive of state-owned enterprises;In addition,the participation of private capital in the upper governance dimension can improve the incentive effect of state-owned enterprises by weakening the choice of the welfare type incentive motivation,and the motivation of equity incentive plays an intermediary role between the two.